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INTRODUCTION
This work is an attempt to describe and analyze the outburst of sectional feeling
that took place in New England in 1800-1815, and arguably brought the United States
under threat of disintegration and civil war. The threat did not come true, having died in
embryo and producing no sanguinary battles, dramatic moments, or heroic personalities.
However, its significance is indisputable. Inconspicuous as it was, New England
sectionalism is important as an illustration of the development of American national
consciousness and deserves attention in the first place from this standpoint.
Practically no book that concerns American political history during the Jefferson
and Madison administrations fails to mention the opposition ofNew England to the
federal government. But there are not many detailed studies ofNew England
sectionalism. Not many historians have gone beyond merely mentioning its existence in
the early 1800s. What receives attention and comment most often is, of course, the
Hartford Convention.
The question that has attracted most scholarly interest is whether the convention
represented a serious threat. What was this political forum in the capital of Connecticut in
the winter of 1814-15 - a harmless and legitimate gesture of political opposition or a
separatist conspiracy?
The discussion started right after the convention. Contemporary politicians were
the first to argue about the meaning of this forum. The leaders of both political parties,
gradually retiring to the backyard of politics, devoted their time and energy to mutual
accusations about the past. A good example is Harrison Gray Otis, one of the most
eminent Federalists of the early 19th-century Massachusetts. In 1820 he published a
series of anonymous letters about the convention in whieh he tried to prove that there was
not "any document extant, except the Farewell Address of Washington, in which the vital
importance of the Federal Union is more seriously inculcated than in the report of that
Convention...". 1 Many former Federalist leaders expressed this point of view, until it
took final shape the famous History of the Hartford CWnti™ by Theodore Dwight
(1764-1846). Historians use this book now chiefly because of the journal and the report
of the convention, that Dwight, himself the former secretary of this forum, published.
Federalist praise of the Hartford Convention met with serious objections from
their Republican opponents. One of the most ardent accusers was President John Quincy
Adams, previously a Federalist who had left his party to become a Republican in 1808.
Adams affirmed that there had existed a secessionist conspiracy in the early 19th century
in New England, and that the Hartford Convention was part of it. In 1828-29, Adams
indulged into long polemics with former Federalist leaders - Harrison Gray Otis, Israel
Thorndike, John Lowell, William Sullivan and others. During a heated newspaper debate
with the old Federalists, Adams wrote a volume over two hundred pages long respecting
the alleged separatist movement in New England in the early 1800s. This work, together
with previous correspondence between the contending parties, was published in 1877 by
Adams's grandson, the great historian Henry Adams,3 who shared the opinion of his
grandfather. In the same book, Henry Adams also published some Federalist
1
Harrison G. Otis, Letters Developing the Character and Views of the Hartford Convention: By "One of
the Convention" . (Washington, D.C., 1820), 33.
2
Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention. With a Review of the Policy of the United States
Government Which Led to the War of 1812 . (1833. Reprint, Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press,
1970).
3
Henry Adams, ed., Documents Relating to New England Federalism. 1 800- 1815 [hereafter DRNEF],
(Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1877).
correspondence from the papers of Timothy Pickering and Harrison Gray Otis. Together,
they made a strong case in favor of John Quincy Adams's opinion about New England
secessionism. Since then, this collection of documents has become a major source for
historians of early national politics. Confident of the existence of a separatist plot in New
England in the early 19th century and of the secessionist character of the Hartford
Convention, Henry Adams fully developed this theory in his History of the TTniteH S^£S
of America during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson ™H James Madison 4
Adams represented the trend of scholars who might be called "family historians."
All of them were descendants of those very politicians who had ruled New England
several dozen years before. These "grandsons" were the first scholars who took New
England sectionalism into serious consideration. Along with Adams, we should mention
William Plumer, Jr., Henry Cabot Lodge, and Samuel Eliot Morison in this group of
historians.
5
Plumer did not openly declare that the convention had been a separatist
forum. However, he mentioned that in the Convention's Report "...the question of
dissolving the Union was discussed at some length." 6 Plumer, though, did not pay much
attention to this question. The attitudes of two other scholars -- Samuel E. Morison and
Henry C. Lodge are more interesting, since their ancestors, Harrison Gray Otis and
George Cabot respectively, both had been delegates of the convention, while William
Plumer had not. In 1913, Morison wrote what has been generally recognized as the
4
Henry Adams, History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison. 2 vols., (New York: The Library of America, cl986).
5
William Plumer Jr., Life of William Plumer. (Boston, 1857); Henry C. Lodge, Life and Letters of George
Cabot . (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1878); Samuel E. Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray
Otis. Federalist. 1765-1848 . 2 vols. (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1913).
6
William Plumer Jr., Life of William Plumer. 422.
classical study of the Hartford Convention in American historiography, 7 arguing that the
convention's aim was to change the nature of the American "national compact" by means
of a radical revision of the Constitution. Constitutional changes, the statement of local
grievances, and the provision of defense measures - such were, in Morison's view, the
principal aims of the convention. As for separation, it was, as he said, "squarely rejected."
Thus, despite all possible reservations, Morison largely assumed the Federalist
standpoint.
Henry Cabot Lodge sought a neutral ground between Morison and Henry Adams,
arguing that there was truth in the statements of both scholars. He described a strong
inclination towards secession that had existed in New England by the time of the Hartford
Convention and suggested that the Convention itself had been "the exponent and result of
a strong separatist feeling." However, Lodge stated that the delegates had "used these
separatist forces to maintain the Union." They had threatened separation, he thought, and
perhaps would have followed through if their demands had not been fulfilled.
Nevertheless, on the premises of Federalist indecision and passivity, Cabot finally came
to the conclusion that "the Hartford Convention was not intended to dissolve the Union." 8
David Hackett Fischer has justly said that the impact of family origin and tradition
on such historians as Adams, Lodge, and Morison was very strong. He therefore doubted
the objectivity of their research. "It is magnificent -- he said about Henry Adams' work --
but is it history?"
9
The question is well founded. Nevertheless, it was these historians who
7
Samuel E. Morison, Life and Letters . 78-199.
8
Henry C. Lodge. Life and Letters . 516-19.
9
David H. Fischer, "The Myth of the Essex Junto," In William and Mary Quarterly (hereafter WMQ), 3d
ser., vol. 21, no. 2 (April 1964): 194.
5shaped the pattern of later discussions about New England regionalism and the Hartford
Convention in particular.
One can generally trace two major lines in the attitudes of historians towards the
convention and events related to it. One may call them the "Adams" (after both Adamses
mentioned) and the "Morison" lines. The first implies that the Convention was a full-
blown secessionist conspiracy, the second that it was legitimate protest rather than
outright secession. In fact, these two lines retrace the age-old controversy between the
Federalists and the Republicans. Practically every book concerning the presidency of
James Madison, the party politics of that period or the War of 1812 describes the Hartford
Convention from Adams's 10 or Morison's 11 standpoint. It is not hard to find that there
For Adams's followers see, e. g., Charles Beard and Mary Beard. A Basic History of the T Inited States.
(Philadelphia, 1944), 174; Stephen F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United State. 5th ed (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 169; Ulane Bonnel, La France. Fes Etats-Unis et la Gnerre He
Course (1797-1 81 5) , (Paris: Nouvelles Editions latines, 1961), 305; Albert H. Z. Carr, The Coming of War
An Account of the Remarkable Even ts Lead ing to the War of 1817 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960),
335; Lloyd Gardner, W. LaFeber, T. McCormick, The Creation of the American Empire: U. S. Diplomatic
'
History, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), 95; Ruth W. Gavian and W. Hamm, The American Story
(Boston, 1945), 161; D. Lawson, The War of 1812. (New York, 1966), 128; Allan Nevins and Henry S.
Commager, America: The Storv of a Free Peop le. 4th ed. (London, 1976), 143.
" For Morison's followers, see, e. g., James T. Adams, The Epic of America (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, ©1931), 144, 146; H. C. Bailey, America: The Framing of a Nation Vol. 1. (Columbus, Ohio,
1975), 146-47; Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic. 2d ed. (Boston,
Toronto, 1961), 217-18; Idem., ed., The American Spirit. United States History as Seen by
Contemporaries, Vol. 1. (Lexington, Mass., 1973), 203-4; P. N. Carroll and D. W. Noble, The Restless
Centuries: A History of the American Peop le. (Minneapolis, 1973), 169-70; O. P. Chitwood, R. W. Patrick,
F. L. Owsley, The American People: A History. Vol. 1. (Princeton, N. J., 1962), 293-4; R. N. Current, T.
H. Williams, F. Freidel, American History: A Survey. 5th ed. Vol. 1. (New York: Knopf, 1979,) 216; Paul
D. Erickson, The Poetry of Events: Daniel Webster's Rhetoric of the Constitution and the Union. (New
York: New York University Press, 1986); Homer C. Hockett, Political and Social Growth of the American
People. 1492-1865. (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 442-45; R. Hofstadter, W. Miller, D. Aaron, The
United States: The History of a Republic. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 225-6; Reginald
Horsman, The War of 1812. (New York: 1969); H. Jones, The Cause of American Diplomacy. From the
Revolution to the Present. (New York: 1985), 77; Maldwyn A. Jones, The Limits of Liberty: American
History. 1607-1980. 4th ed. (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 104-5; J. A. Krout and D.
R. Fox, The Completion of Independence. 1790-1830. (New York: Macmillan: 1944), 200-8; Benjamin W.
Labaree, Patriots and Partisans: The Merchants of Newburyport. 1764-1815. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1962), 197-8; Elise Marienstras, Naissance de la Republique Federate (1783-1828).
(Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1987), 136-7; R. A. McCaughey, Josiah Quincy. 1772-1864: The
Last Federalist. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 25, 82-83; D. Perkins and G. G. Van
have been many more historians who side with the latter point of view, that is, that the
convention had nothing to do with secessionism.
A few studies have concentrated specifically on New England sectionalism. In
1915, Charles R. Brown asserted that the Hartford Convention had indeed been a
separatist plot.
12
However, Samuel Eliot Morison, while reviewing Brown's book,
severely criticized the author for the insufficient use of primary as well as secondary
sources and denied his arguments. 13
James Truslow Adams published his famous work in 1926. Although giving a
good, detailed account of the development ofNew England separatism during the War of
1812 as well previously, 14 Adams believed that the Hartford Convention itself had been
moderate and did not aim at secession. 15 In 1934, William E. Buckley published his small
brochure about the convention. As the author himself confessed, he had made "extensive
use... of Professor Morison's work in preparing this essay." 16 This, no doubt, influenced
his opinion substantially. Buckley thought that John Quincy Adams's insistence on the
convention's secessionism was "a perversion of the spirit of the document prepared at
Deusen, The United States of America. A History . Vol. 1. (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 273-4; Helen R.
Pinkney, Christopher Gore. Federalist of Massachusetts: 1758-1827. Waltham, Mass.: Gore Place Society,
1969); E. H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections. (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 72-73;
Clarence L. Ver Steeg and Richard Hofstadter, A People and a Nation. (New York, 1971), 173-4; C. M.
Webster, Town Meeting Country. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Peace, 1945), 131; F. W. Wellborn, The
Growth of American Nationality. 1492-1965. (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 451-52.
1
Charles R. Brown, The Northern Confederacy According to the Plans of the "Essex Junto". 1796-1814.
Princeton, N.J., 1915.
13
See: American Historical Review [hereafter ~ AHR] 21 (April, 1916), 634.
14
James T. Adams, New England in the Republic: 1776-1850. (Boston, 1926), 281-301.
15
Ibid., 298-99.
16
William E. Buckley, The Hartford Convention. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 29.
Hartford"; "the contention of Otis that the Convention wished to silenee the secession
clamor is at least as logical as the theory which Adams advanced." 17
David H. Fischer contributed substantially to our subject by publishing his
heralded book in 1965. Fischer touched upon the question of secessionism and
disunionism and, in frames of the old "Morison line" concluded that "with few
exceptions, disunion was never the object of young Federalist leaders in New England,"
nor of the Hartford Convention. 18
Several valuable books appeared in the 1970s. James M. Banner, Jr. published his
excellent study of Massachusetts Federalism in 1970.
19
In a broad analysis of the
Hartford Convention he strongly denied that it had aimed at the severance of the Union.
"There is no evidence to sustain this judgment," - Banner writes.20 His opinion was
based on the fact that most of the Convention delegates were moderate and, more than
that, "at bottom... profoundly attached to the Union." "No Convention member, nor for
that matter any reflecting Federalist, ever seriously contemplated disunion as an
alternative in 1814," - Banner asserts.
21
Although Banner's study seemed to have offered a definitive word in the
discussion, it only stirred further debate. In 1972 there appeared a doctoral dissertation by
Anthony F. Eastman specially devoted to the question ofNew England secessionism in
1 796-1 8 1 5. In this broad context, the author regarded the Hartford Convention as an
17
Ibid., 28.
18
David H. Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism. The Federalist Party in the Era of
Jeffersonian Democracy. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 177.
19
James M. Banner Jr., To the Hartford Convention; The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in
Massachusetts. 1789-1815. (New York: Knopf), 1970.
20
Ibid., 331.
21
Ibid.. 344.
same
an
inherently secessionist forum whose primary concern had been the future dissolution of
the Union. "The report of the delegates," Eastman wrote, "is clear... The report prepared a
way to justify secession... The convention intended to prepare public opinion for another
convention which would formulate an ordinance of secession."22 Eastman insists that the
entire report of the Hartford Convention was imbued with this secessionist idea. Thus, the
"Adams line" was revived - perhaps, in its most radical shape. However, in the
year Donald R. Hickey, the author of another doctoral dissertation, put forward
opposite statement. "The report of the Hartford Convention was by and large a moderate
document," Hickey said.23 More than that; he comes to the conclusion that the
Convention had not aimed even at any major acts of opposition to the Federal
government. "It was called, rather, to deal with more immediate problems, namely the
defense ofNew England and other issues related to the war." 24 Thus, the "Morison line,"
or, better to say, the initial line of the Federalists of 1815, was revived as well. Thus, the
same year witnessed two contrary opinions about the same phenomenon. Historians were
apparently brought to bay, and such is the condition in which the debate exists now, since
no major studies of the subject have appeared since that time. An article by James M.
Banner was published in the History Today magazine in 1988. It is interesting that
Banner, although he reconfirms his former statement about the non-separatist character of
the Convention, apparently acknowledges this time that separatism had been implied, if
not stated in its report, and that the Hartford Convention had created the soil on which
22
Anthony F. Eastman, "Federalist Ideology and Secession, 1796-1815," Ph.D. diss. University of
Southern Mississippi, 1972, 262.
23
Donald R. Hickey, "The Federalists and the War of 1812," Ph.D. diss. University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 1972,325.
24
Ibid.. 331.
Southern secessionism developed later. The headline of the article also stressed the
secessionist aspect of the problem.25
Finally, we should mention a 1996 essay by Peter Onuf on the origins of
American sectionalism.26 Onuf does not deal precisely with the War of 1812; in fact, he
concentrates on the 1780s and 1790s. However, this work offers a valuable general
rationale for sectional sentiment in the early republic. To put it briefly, Onuf, in his
analysis, regards nationalism and sectionalism as inseparable phenomena, writing about
"the dialectical relationship between union and section,"27 inherent in the very
construction of the American federation since the adoption of the Constitution. Both
unionism and sectionalism were equally strong and vivid in the minds of early American
politicians, whether Federalists or Republicans. I discovered Onuf s work while in
process of writing this thesis. To my content, many of his conclusions have proved
similar to those to which I came during my research.
James M. Banner, "A Shadow of Secession? The Hartford Convention, 1814," In History Today 38
(September 1988): 24-30.
26
Peter S. Onuf, "Federalism
,
Republicanism, and the Origins of American Sectionalism," In Edward L.
Ayers, Patricia N. Limerick, Stephen Nissenbaum, Peter S. Onuf, All Over the Map: Rethinking American
Regions. (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, ©1996), 1 1-37.
27
Ibid., 31.
CHAPTER 1
FROM THE JEFFERSONIAN REVOLUTION TO "MR. MADISON'S WAR"
1.1. The Surge of 1801
On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson became President of the United States of
America. Federalists, already fractional and discordant, were stunned - to the point that
most of them kept silence during the first couple of weeks. Then the more energetic
recovered. Among them was Fisher Ames (1758-1808), one of the most farsighted
Federalist leaders. On March 19, 1801, he wrote to Theodore Dwight:
I conceive that the Virginia politics are violent, according to the temper of her
Taylors, Monroes, and Gileses,29 and I may add Jeffersons. They are vindictive,
because that State owes much, and the commercial States have gained, and now
'
possess, much; and this newly accumulated moneyed interest, so corrupt and
corrupting, is considered a rival interest, that baffles Virginia in her claim of
ruling the public counsels. The great State has the ambition to be the great
nation... By pointing out the utter ruin of the commercial States by a Virginia or
democratic system, may we not consolidate the federalists, and check the
licentiousness of the jacobin administration?... It will be too late to alarm after the
contagious principles of Jacobinism have made New England as rotten as
Pennsylvania, [emphasis in text]30
What strikes one in the passage cited above is an inseparable connection that the author
draws between political belief and geographical situation. Ames obviously identified
Republicans as a Virginian, a Southern party, whereas the Northeast was for him a
rampart of Federalism, and as such he suggested to use it. Ames's thoughts on this
Taylor, John (1753-1 824), U. S. senator from Virginia ( 1 792-94; 1 803 ; 1 822-24); author of An Inquiry
into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States (1814).
29
Giles, William Branch (1762-1830), member, U. S. House of Representatives (1790-98; 1801-03); U. S.
senator (1804- 15).
30 Ames to Theodore Dwight, 19 March 1801. Works of Fisher Ames. With a Selection from His Speeches
and Correspondence. 2 vols., ed. Seth Ames (Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1854), 1: 292-94.
10
11
to
least.
federalists must entrench themselves in the State governments, and endeavor
ake State justice and State power a shelter of the wise
,
and good, and rich
1 the wild destroying rage of the southern Jacobins. Such a post will be a high
from which to combine in our favor the honest sentiments ofNew England at
Ames himself started the practical realization of his own schemes. In February 1801, he
published a series of four pamphlets under the general title, "Falkland," in the New
England Palladium. The subtitle read: "To New England Men."32 A denunciation of
Jeffersonian ideology (and of Jefferson himself), Falkland^ full of grave predictions
about the future ofNew England in the nation ruled by the archenemy of commerce. One
could not deny Ames the gift of political prevision:
There is evidence enough, that the party expected to rule is not friendly to the
commerce of any of the States, and especially to the fisheries and navigation of
the Eastern States. We do not want, they argue, an expensive navy for the sake of
these; nor these for the sake of the navy. Navies breed wars, and wars augment
navies, and both augment expenses, and this brings forth funding systems, banks,
and corrupt influence. These few words contain the system of our new politicians,
which it is probable they will be in future, as in times past, complaisant enough to
call philosophy.
33
"Expect commercial regulations, which will profess to cramp British commerce, and will
cramp our own. First revenue, wealth, and credit will take flight; then peace," ~ Ames
wrote in 1801, thus exactly predicting the embargo of 1807 and the War of 18 12. 34
31 Ames to Christopher Gore, 13 December 1802, ibid., 310.
32
Ibid., 2: 128-144.
33
Ibid., 132.
34
Ibid., 143.
12
Falkland marked the earliest considerable Federalist reaction to Jefferson's
victory. It takes no great flight of imagination to see that this reaction was sectionally
biased. Besides the fact that the articles had a special addressee, "the men ofNew
England," Ames made the regional message explicit, not only emphasizing the material
and moral superiority ofNew England over other regions of the United States, but
speaking about New England as a separate nation:
New England now contains a million and a half of inhabitants, of all the colonies
ever founded, the largest, the most assimilated, and, to use the modem prgnn
nationalized
,
the most respectable and prosperous, the most truly interesting to
America and to humanity, more unlike and more superior to other people (the
English excepted,)than the old Roman race to their neighbors and competitors.
This people
,
whose spirit is as lofty as their destiny, is settled on an extensive
coast, and by situation and character, has a greater proportion of its inhabitants
engaged in navigation and maritime affairs than France or England, perhaps than
even Holland. In spirit and enterprise no nation exceeds them. 35 [emphasis added].
It is not by chance that I pay so much attention to Ames. Extraordinarily bright,
strikingly predictive and remarkably energetic, he presented an exception to the general
rule of Federalist sluggishness and inertia in 1801. David H. Fischer calls him, along with
several others, a "transitional" figure in Federalist politics - "too young to find old-
school doctrines acceptable, too old to acquiesce in new realities."
36
But if we use
Fischer's own definition of young Federalists - those who "responded to the
Jeffersonian movement with energy, flexibility, and effect" -- Ames ought to belong here.
A proponent of active Federalist opposition, an early supporter of partisanship, and a
creator of the New England Palladium, Ames was one of those Federalists who continued
35
Ibid., 134.
36
David H. Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of
Jeffersonian Democracy. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 21.
13
the struggle and looked for new ways of carrying it out. By this standard, he was among
the young. This is why his emphasis on sectional ideology was important - he looked not
in the past, but in the future.
Sectionalist ideas similar to those of Ames seem to have emerged simultaneously
and independently among Federalists in different corners ofNew England. In January -
February 1801, The Hampshire Gazette, organ of the staunchly Federalist Connecticut
River Valley in Massachusetts, started to publish articles of an entirely new character. A
struggle for presidency was still going on between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr -
both Republicans - and for the want of any better option, the Gazette's correspondents
were choosing between the two evils. A Hartford contributor to the Gazette obviously
preferred the latter:
There are many reasons why Col. Burr is preferable to Mr. Jefferson -- He is of
New England Extract - his father was a very pious, and worthy clergyman -- he is
not beloved by the Democrats -- but above all if he is President,... he will set up a
rigid government for his myrmidons, and like the Chief Consul Bonaparte...
govern them with an iron sceptre." The author concluded his article this way: "...If
we must have a democratic President, let it be BURR. Virginia will find that the
northern states do not intend yet to bow to her sceptre.37 [emphasis in text]
Nothing of the kind had ever appeared in the Gazette during the previous year, 1800.
Quite apart from the merits of Aaron Burr's venerable father and the "benefits" of being
ruled with a Bonaparte-like iron scepter, the message of the article was clear enough,
even without italicizing: Burr was preferable because he was le sien — "ofNew England
Extract," as opposed to the consummate Southerner Jefferson. One is left only to amaze
at how swiftly this transition to sectionalism occurred. No definitive strategy, no new
37
Hampshire Gazette (hereafter HQ), 14 January 1801
14
political tactics, no reorganization had yet taken shape among Federalist leaders reeling
from defeat. Their reaction was spontaneous, and thereby the more interesting - this
showed that defensive sectionalism came from their own minds and hearts.
Reading the same Hampshire Gazette closely, one can observe growing anti-
Southernism during 1801. Almost every issue contained at least one article attacking the
South, especially Virginia. On January 21, the anonymous author of the article entitled,
"Who would be President?" transparently hinted at the injustice of the 3/5 clause in the
Constitution that favored the South at elections, throwing "the weight of about half a
million of black cattle" into their scale.
38
The infamous clause had quickly become an
obsession for New England Federalists who now blamed their electoral defeat on the
unjust distribution of electoral rights. On February 4, 1801 the Gazette reprinted a
correspondence from the Boston New England Palladium, under the title, "A Plain Fact."
Its author, concealed under the pseudonym, "A Federalist," demonstrated that it was the
silent 3/5 of the slaves who had brought victory to their masters. Had the votes of free
Southerners only been counted, he argued, John Adams would have become President
again.
39
Another article in the Gazette, marked February 12 but published on March 11,
together with the news of Jefferson's election, discussed the prospect of Republicans
using force to secure national power, and ensuing civil war:
If the tumultuous meetings of a set of factious foreigners in Pennsylvania, or a
fewfighting bacchanals of Virginia, mean the people, and are to dictate to the
Congress of the United States whom to elect as President ~ if the constitutional
rights of this body are so soon to become the prey to anarchy and faction - if we
have already arrived at that disastrous period in the life of nations, 'when liberty
consists in no loner reverencing either the law or the authorities' ~ if, in short, the
38 HG,21 January 1801.
39
"A Plain Fact," HG, 4 February 1801.
15
scenes which sadden the history of the elective monarchies of Europe are so soon
to be reacted in America, it would be prudent to prepare at once for the contest 40[emphasis in text]
The punctual author did not hesitate to explain what kind of a contest this would be:
With the militia of Massachusetts, consisting of... 70,000 (regulars let us call
them) in arms » with those of N. Hampshire and Connecticut, united almost to a
man, with half the number at least of the citizens of eleven other states, ranged
under the federal banner in support of the constitution, what could Pennsylvania,
aided by Virginia - the militia of the latter untrained and farcically the manual
'
exercise with cornstalks... - what may be it asked, would be the issue of the
struggle? [emphasis in text]
Although party was suggested as the foundation of this potential civil war, state
alignment did play a role: the article demonized Virginia while opposing it to New
England as the main base of Federalism - in this case, in pure military terms. Clearly,
Federalists more and more envisioned New England as their last bastion. A few weeks
later, Gazette editor William Butler reprinted another piece from the Columbian Centinel,
entitled, "The Principles of the Northern Confederacy Examined!!" The term "Northern
Confederacy" pertained here not to New England or Northeastern states in general,
although such an impression might arise from a superficial reading of the article. The
words "Northern Confederacy" referred to a possible alliance of North European
commercial powers, joined by the United States, against the depredations of France. Two
things deserve attention. First of all, the term "Northern Confederacy" still anticipated
what Timothy Pickering would suggest two years later, in 1803, when he proposed the
secession ofNew England and New York from the United States. Secondly, the article
HG . 1 1 March 1801 (italics in the text).
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presented a clear parallel - European powers detested the ruinous policies of France
regarding international commerce; and there existed the possibility of a similar clash
between the American federal government controlled by anti-commercial Southerners,
and New England states heavily invested in sea trade:
If by the narrow, the local prejudices of any of her sister States, the Navigation ofNew England shall be jeopardized or destroyed, we must bid adieu to our
importance, our prosperity, and our wealth. ... Let them [Southerners] raise their
luxuriant crops of Wheat, Indigo, Tobacco, Cotton and Rice,... but let New
England which nature has deprived of these advantages, only have the advantage
of carrying their produce to market.
... But let not that power which was invested
in the General Government for the general welfare and to provide for the common
good, be perverted from the aggrandizement of one part of the Union and to the
destruction of the other.
42
Throughout 1801, scattered articles in the Hampshire Gazette bore sectionalist hues of
varying intensity. In the heat of June, 1 801 , an anonymous local poet burst out with a
song named "To the Yeomen of Hampshire":
I.
To the shades of our ancestors loud is the praise,
That descends with their deeds, and inspires by reaction:
To the heirs of their glory the paean we raise,
"The Yeomen of Hampshire," the Victors of Faction;
Be theirs the proud tale,
That though Anarch Assail,
Each plowman still sings to the Stream ofhis Vale.
CHORUS:
Roll on, lov 'd Connecticut, long hast thou run;
Giving blossoms to Nature and morals to the Man.
II.
Where'er thy rich waters' erratic display
Thy deluge of plenty, like Nile, overflooding;
The Mind and the Reason thy impulse obey,
And Patriot virtue and String are in budding;
While each leaf, as it shoots,
With its promise of fruits,
42
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Proclaims the thrift moisture that cultures its roots
CHORUS:
Roll on, lov 'd Connecticut, long hast thou run;
Giving blossoms to Nature and morals to the Man.
III.
Through the vallies of Hampshire, bright Order's abode,
Thou lov' st in gay circles to range and to wander;
While pleas'd with thy empire, to lengthen the road,
Thou giv'st to thy channel, another meander;
And when on the way,
Near Northampton you stray,
How slow moves thy current its homage to pay
CHORUS:
Roll on, lov'd Connecticut,
... etc., etc.
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In July -- August, 1801, the Gazette reprinted another series of articles by Fisher
Ames from the Palladium. This time it was a complete eulogy ofNew England -- its
"schools, colleges, towns and parishes, its close population, its learned clergy,... its light
and knowledge, its arts and commerce, and spirit of enterprize," etc., etc. Ames asserted
not less than the following: "New England has a very distinct and well defined national
character; the only part of the United States that has yet any pretensions to it." 44
The clergy was also on the alert. On December 22, 1801, Reverend John Allyn
delivered an anniversary sermon at Plymouth, Massachusetts, "commemorative of the
pious ancestors who first immigrated to that place, 1620." Closing an hour-long eulogy of
the first New England colonists, the pastor allowed himself to expatiate on the present
and future of the United States as a nation:
When we contemplate the present importance of the United States in connexion
with a period short of 200 years, we have a comment on the prophetic expression,
"A nation born at once." In the course of two centuries and our sons will be
HG . 10 June 1801 (emphasis in text).
"From the Palladium," HG, 29 July 1801.
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and the wilderness beyond "shall blossom
s a rose. But alas, a retrospect of past events begets the unpleasant anticipation
of wars and fightings. We see in future prospect the Kings of the South, begotten
of luxury pride licentiousness and impiety, invading the hardy inhabitants of the
North. We see the armies of the East and West encountering each other at some
narrow pass in the mountains, like the armies of Europe and Asia at the streights
of Ihermopylae. We see thrones and sceptres, bastiles and fetters, the punishment
of heaven on guilty men, who no longer deserve liberty, or are capable of
enjoying her.
The pastor's apocalyptic view of what awaited the union of American states epitomized
the general feelings ofNew England Federalists in 1801. Many of them viewed the defeat
of their party and Republican victory as the downfall ofNew England and triumph of the
South. Close identification of conflicting parties and interests with regions led to the
regionalization of political opposition. Having lost on the national level, these Federalists
turned to struggle on the regional one. This does not appear to have been a result of
coordinated or centralized initiative, but rather a spontaneous phenomenon. The
Federalist leadership had not yet elaborated any strategy; their party organization was
very imperfect and simply could not react to events quickly, as sectional feeling spread to
different corners ofNew England. The very fact that national power had passed into the
hands of a party potentially hostile to New England interest and alien to New England
cultural tradition was enough for the opposition to start speaking in sectionalist terms.
Cultural antagonism between New England and the South is another important
phenomenon, but its history transcends the chronological and conceptual frames of this
work. Although a complete history of nationalism and sectionalism in the United States
45
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cannot but discuss this subject, my task here is more narrow - to present the attitude of
early 19th-century New England politicians towards the Union and the relations between
New England and the rest of the new republic. Nevertheless, my further research should
and will deal more with cultural subject-matter.
The fact that Federalists started to speak in sectional terms did not mean that they
had no national feelings. In April 1801, one anonymous correspondent to the same
Hampshire Gazette observed: "Fellow-Citizens, we are all one Family, and whatever is
advantageous to one part of the community, is likewise to the other,... let us forbear to
cast ungenerous reflections, let us act worthy of the character of AMERICANS.
... Let us
by steadiness, by firmness and good agreement, make known to the world, that we not
only have bled to establish a republic, but are determined by true republican principles, to
hold fast, each to the other, and contend for nothing but UNITY"46 And on July 4, 1 801
,
toasts raised at the tables in the Hampshire County in Massachusetts were still very much
in the nationalist spirit. Among the multitude of toasts, only one was distinctly sectional.
"A Selected Party of Young Men" assembled at Mrs. Lyman's Inn, drank to "The New
England States," wishing that they may "never submit to Virginia Politics." Otherwise,
the inhabitants of Northampton, Granby, Easthampton, Worthington, Chesterfield and
other cities of the Hampshire County still drank to the "Union and harmony" of the
American people, to American Independence, the Federal Constitution, and even to
President Jefferson, albeit with a clearly visible reservation — "May he emulate the
Virtues of his Predecessors, and be as fortunate in saving his country from the miseries of
46
"For the Hampshire Gazette," HQ, 22 April 1 80
1
20
War."
47
The Gazette squarely denied Republican accusations of a Federalist secessionist
48
conspiracy. It seems that, even though New England regional consciousness was
awakened by Jefferson's electoral victory, it had still a long way to go before it would
present serious threat to the integrity of the Union. Besides, in the course of 1801
sectional propaganda in New England Federalist press slowly diminished in frequency,
length, and rhetorical fervor. The reason, perhaps, was that the new national
administration had not so far taken any measures ruinous to New England benefit, which
"Ames & C." had predicted. Jefferson's famous "We are all Republicans, we are all
Federalists" obviously had a calming effect on New England. In 1802, a few regionalist
articles that did appear were clearly exceptional. Writers occasionally mentioned New
England as "La Vendee of America"49 or referred to Virginia's hostility toward New
England
.
By Christmas, however, passions had calmed, and the storm caused by
Jefferson's victory had abated.
Among the Federalist leadership, not many responded to the appeals and
predictions of Fisher Ames. During the first three years of Jefferson's administration,
despite a few efforts to revitalize the opposition, like the transformation of the New
England Palladium into a Federalist electioneering paper in 1800-1801 (a yearly
subscription provided every clergyman in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont
with this newspaper50), Federalists remained dormant, preferring contemplation to action.
In February 1803, desperate Ames exclaimed:
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I have, over and oyer again, made the offer to almost every considerable man inConneCtlcut and New Hampshire, as well as Massachusetts, to form a phalanx to
write, etc. My offers have produced some ridicule, more disgust, no cooperationWear and disgusted myself, despairing, as well I may, of any good effect from my
single efforts, I now claim the quiet repose that, like a fool, I have so long refused
to enjoy, and that I have so fruitlessly offered to renounce. I have done. Let the
federalists who are made for slaves, although their driver will be at great charge
for whips, reap where they have sown; their harvest is ripening, and it will be all
tares.
1.2. The Evil Purchase, or the Surge of 1803-04
However, something else was ripening beside the tares. In May 1803, the federal
government purchased Louisiana from France for eighty million francs or 15,000,000
dollars. New England Federalists were less than enthusiastic about the purchase. Benefits,
they believed, would accrue exclusively on the Western and Southern states, whereas the
burden of payment would lie chiefly on the Northeast. Besides, the availability of new
and cheap lands would prompt westward migration, leaving vast areas in the Atlantic
states uncultivated. And, finally and principally, new states would sooner or later emerge
in the newly acquired territories, thereby diminishing the relative power of the older
Eastern states in the national councils. The sectional feelings ofNew England Federalists
were anti-Western as well as anti-Southern, as Westerners were allegedly wild, savage,
and united with the South in everything hostile to the Northeast. 52 In territorial terms, the
West became the largest region of the United States. Its delegates would, in the course of
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time, join the Senate and the House, where, as most Federalists were convinced, they
would oppose the interests ofNew England. In that case, as a contemporary observer
hidden under the pseudonym "Calculator," caustically remarked, "the men of the East,
while they would inevitably experience the diminution and almost total loss of their
political weight and consequence, might still, perhaps, console themselves by recounting
the valorous deeds of their fathers, in achieving our national independence."53
Ratification of the treaty with France in November 1803 alerted Federalists all
over New England to the full scope of danger. Besides, in December 1 803, a great battle
took place in Congress over the 12th Amendment which provided for each presidential
elector to vote separately for President and vice-president. Federalists opposed the
amendment because it would disadvantage a candidate from a small state (into which
category all New England states fell). Nevertheless, the amendment passed on December
9, 1803. Moreover, exasperated by the February, 1803, John Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison, Jefferson launched an attack on Federalist judiciary. The
impeachment of John Pickering, district judge ofNew Hampshire, and Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase, was initiated. Though both efforts did not take place until March
1804, Federalists grew apprehensive long before.
As a result of all this - the annexation of Louisiana, adoption of the 12th
Amendment, and impending attack on the judiciary -- an eruption of sectional
"A Comparative View of the Disadvantages and Benefits, Which Would Probably Accrue to the United
States, from an Enlargement of Their Territorial Limits by the Purchase of Either Louisiana or the
Floridas," no. V, HQ, 28 September 1803.
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propaganda broke out among Federalists in late 1803-1804. It was at this time that the
first known scheme of New England secession appeared.
The authorship belonged to Colonel Timothy Pickering ( 1 745- 1 829), once the
adjutant general (1 777-78) and quartermaster general (1780-83) of the Continental army,
then U. S. postmaster general ( 1 791-95), secretary of war ( 1 795) and finally secretary of
state (1795-1 800), from which post he was dismissed by President Adams. In 1 803
Pickering was elected U. S. Senator from Massachusetts and retained this position
through 1 8 1 1
.
In 1 8 1 3 he became member of the U.S.I louse of Representatives and held
this last official seat of his until 1817. In late 1803, the newly elected Senator Pickering,
then residing in Washington, D. C, notched his famous scheme ofNew England
separation from the Union.
On December 24, 1 803, Pickering sent a short letter to Richard Peters (1 744-
1 828), a judge of the U. S. district court of Pennsylvania, whom he knew from the times
of the Revolutionary War, when Peters had been secretary of the Continental Board of
War ( 1 776-8 1 ). The letter read:
My Dear Friend,
-Although the end of our Revolutionary labors and expectations is
disappointment, and our fond hopes of republican happiness are vanity, and the
real patriots of '76 are overwhelmed by the modern pretenders to that character, I
will not despair: I will rather anticipate a new confederacy, exempt from the
corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic Democrats of
the South. There will be -- and our children at farthest will see it - a separation.
The white and black population mark the boundary. The British Provinces, even
with the assent of Britain, will become members of the Northern confederacy. A
continued tyranny of the present ruling sect will precipitate that event . The
patience of good citizens is now nearly exhausted. By open violations and
pretended amendments they are shattering our political bark, which, with a few
more similar repairs, must founder. Efforts, however, and laudable ones, are and
24
will continue to be made to keep the timbers together. The most distinguished you
will find in the speech of Mr. Tracy, which I enclose... 54
This letter is well known to historians, since it is the first and the most succinct rendition
of Pickering's secessionist scheme. One aspect immediately draws attention: Pickering
did not crave for secession. He expressly called efforts to preserve the Union "laudable"
and portrayed separation ofNew England as a forced measure, made necessary by the
"aristocratic Democrats of the South" who, with their oppressive policies, distorted the
original design of the confederacy. While entertaining secession, Pickering realized that it
was an evil. The North wasforced to secede because of the South. This was a formula
that would be present afterwards in almost every Federalist discourse that mentioned
disunion.
In early 1804, Pickering wrote similar letters to George Cabot, Theodore Lyman,
and Rufus King, specifying his design of the Northern Confederacy. 55 As becomes clear
from this correspondence, the occasion that prompted him to suggest separation, was the
dismissal of Federalist judges. "When such grounds are taken ... to destroy the rights of
the judges, whose rights can be safe?" -- he wrote in his letter to Cabot, which
chronologically preceded the two others.
56
Later, in his letter to King, Pickering stated
other reasons -- slave representation, the acquisition of Louisiana, and alteration of the
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Constitotion.57 But all these were, so to say, features of a larger, all-embracing cause for
separation, which, m Pickering's interpretation, was of a moral character:
I have m( ,rc than once asked myself, For what are we Struggling? Our lands yield
their increase, our commerce nourishes, we are building houses,
'are marrying
and given m marriage,' yet we are dissatisfied: 1101 because we envy the men in
Office,
- to most oi us a private life is most desirable. The Federalists are
dissatisfied, beeause they see the public morals debased by the corrupt and
eorruplmg system of OUT rulers. Men are tempted to become apostates not to
federalism merely, but to virtue and to religion and to good government
Apostasy and original depravity are the qualifications lor official honors and
emoluments, while men of sterling worth are displaced and held up to popular
eontempt and scorn. And shall we sit still, until this system shall universally
triumph? until even in the Eastern States the principles of genuine Federalism
shall be overwhelmed? 58
Pickering also speculated about the practical way to implement secession, albeit not quite
elearly. The main say would apparently belong to state legislatures; 5" but "a bold but sale
step by members of Congress" ought to give the states a signal/'" According to
Pickering's plan, Massachusetts would take the lead; Connecticut would "instantly join"
her, as well as New I lampshire; Rhode Island would "follow, of necessity"; and alter
that, it would not be too difficult to bring in Vermont. Interestingly, Pickering suggested
not Massachusetts but New York as the center ofthe would-be confederacy. "...It can
hardly be supposed,"
--he wrote, ~ "that she would refuse her consent. New Jersey would
assuredly become an associate; and it is to be wished that Pennsylvania, at least east of
the Susquehannah, might be induced to come into the confederation."'' 1 I le then reiterated
his point about the British Provinces joining the confederacy. Britain, he thought, would
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not object, for in case they became independent, she would continue to derive from them
all extant commercial advantages without the expense of governing and defending them.
In the letter to Theodore Lyman, Pickering also considered a more narrow version of the
confederacy confined to New England states: "If even the New England States alone are
agreed in the first instance, would there be any difficulty in making frank and open
proposition for a separation?"62 After disunion, relations with the South and West would
remain good and friendly. Pickering wished "no ill to the Southern States and those
naturally connected with them" [the West?] - he suggested to apportion public debts
equitably "between the new confederacies" and favored the continuance of "friendly and
commercial intercourse" between the North and the South. 63
Pickering was not alone. According to Henry Adams, four of the six Federalist
senators from the Eastern States
--William Plumer (1759-1850) ofNew Hampshire, Uriah
Tracy (1755-1807) and James Hillhouse (1754-1832) of Connecticut, and Pickering
himself - took part in the plot. Among Federalist members of the House, Adams names
Roger Griswold (1768-1812) and Calvin Goddard (1768-1842) of Connecticut and
Samuel Hunt ofNew Hampshire. 64 Indeed, there are some hints at that in Pickering's
letters - for example, speaking about New England resistance to the Republican
administration, he mentions that "the most intelligent of the Federalists here [in
Washington] have been reflecting on this subject with the deepest concern."65 Henry
Adams also discovered a letter from Tapping Reeve (1744-1823), a Connecticut lawyer
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married to the sister of Aaron Burr, to Uriah Tracy, in which Reeve spoke favorably
about separation and suggested the same scheme as Pickering's: first, a group ofNew
England Federalists in Congress would "come out with a bold address to... [their]
constituents;" then, state legislatures would follow "by such declarations as may have the
strongest tendency to secure the object aimed at."66 Roger Griswold, too, asserted that
there could be "no safety to the Northern States without a separation frn.
confederacy "67
It is not surprising that the secessionist scheme was born at Washington. Congress
was the only place where the spokesmen ofNew England state Federalist elites coexisted
for long periods of time and were able to discuss politics every day in live conversations
rather than in correspondence; it was also the front line of political warfare, where New
Englanders and Virginians saw and heard each other every day and collided directly in
heated rhetorical battles. Nowhere was the atmosphere of party hostility so readily
complemented by the sense of defending the interests of one's state or region.
The down side of it was that living for several months at Washington left one
guessing about the state of public opinion at home. Most Federalists in New England and
New York to whom Pickering wrote, rejected his plan of separation or gave him evasive
answers. Among them were George Cabot, Theodore Lyman, Rufus King, Stephen
Higginson, Theophilus Parsons, and Fisher Ames.
68
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wrote Ames,
- "say all is lost, - nothing can be done. Nothing is to be done rashly; but
mature counsels and united efforts are necessary in the most forlorn case."69 The rest of
them reacted similarly.
Remarkable, however, was that none of them repudiated secession in principle.
None referred to the treachery and baseness of such a scheme from the standpoint of
noble patriotic sentiment. On the contrary, many spoke openly in favor of separation, but
only questioned its timing. For example, Stephen Higginson (1743-1828) wrote to
Pickering:
I have seen your letters to Mr. Cabot and Mr. Lyman on the question of
separation, which is a very delicate and important one, considered in the abstract.
We all agree there is no doubt of its being desirable; but of the expediency of
attempting it, or discussing it now at this moment, we all very much doubt. ... It
would indeed be very unpopular to suggest the idea of its being either expedient
or necessary.
... As, in the present state of things, it would be imprudent even to
discuss the question, we must wait the effects of still greater outrage and insult
from those in power before we prepare for the only measure which can save the
New England States from the snares of Virginia. 70
George Cabot, who was at times considered "the wisest head in his party,"71 expressed
similar ideas:
I am convinced we cannot do what is wished; but we can do much, if we work
with nature (or the course of things), and not against her. A separation is now
impracticable, because we do not feel the necessity or utility of it. The same
separation then will be unavoidable, when our loyalty to the Union is generally
perceived to be the instrument of debasement and impoverishment. ... I have said
that a separation now is not desirable, because we should not remedy the evil, but
69
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should bring it home and aggravate it by eherishing and giving new sanctions tothe causes which produce it. But, if a separation should by and by be produced by
suffering I think it might be accompanied by important amelioration of our
theories,
In other words, no one appeared to really condemn Pickering for his secessionist
propositions. Federalist leaders saw nothing criminal or even reproachable in disunion,
and spoke in a matter-of-fact way about its being inexpedient at that particular moment,
for the want of popular support. The majority ofNew-Englanders had yet to feel the full
effect of Republican policies, and for that one had to wait until the Jeffersonians would
commit some gross blunder. A bunch of Federalist congressmen concerned about the
danger for New England was not enough.
Besides, even in Congress, only a few Northern senators and representatives were
in favor of separation and willing to undertake "a bold but safe step." To speak
authoritatively on behalf of their region, Northerners had to be united. Meanwhile, if we
believe Henry Adams, Federalist senators John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts and
Mills Olcott ofNew Hampshire did not support the idea of separation. 73 Besides, there
were some Northern Republicans, who, interestingly enough, became sectionally minded
as well. But they also lacked unity and resolution. Roger Griswold wrote angrily in
March 1804:
...Many of the Democratic members of Congress from the Northern States have
become sensible of the overbearing influence of Virginia. A few of them appear
disposed to attempt some union which shall create a Northern interest, and array it
in opposition to Virginia; but this disposition is by no means universal. The
difficulty arises from the want of character and talents in those who have been
72
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sent to Congress.
...Many of the others grumble about Virginia, but go every
length in their votes The formation therefore, of a Northern interest must
commence at home.
As "the head of the Northern interest," Griswold suggested to consider viee-president
Aaron Burr (1756-1836). Most Federalists distrusted Burr and disliked him personally.
They considered him to be dangerously adventurous, ambitious and unprincipled.
Besides, he was a Democrat. On the other hand, there must have been something in that
man, that enabled him to challenge Thomas Jefferson in the presidential election of 1800
much more successfully than President John Adams did. Burr above all was a man of
action, which was his tremendous advantage over numerous Federalist theoreticians good
at rhetoric and prognostication but hardly capable of fighting a serious political battle
against Republicans.
The congressional Republican caucus that met on February 24, 1804, announced
George Clinton to be Jefferson's prospective running mate in the presidential elections.
Having thus abandoned any hope of retaining the vice-presidency, Burr weighed into the
New York state gubernatorial campaign. To have a Jefferson's opponent of such scope at
such a post would have been a great trump for the Federalists. Besides, Timothy
Pickering suggested making New York the center of the Northern Confederacy in late
January 1 804, that is, approximately when Burr learned with certainty that he had few
chances for vice-presidency. We do not know if there was any connection between the
two facts ~ if Pickering made his proposal about New York as the center while bearing
Roger Griswold to Oliver Wolcott, 1 1 March 1804, DRNEF . 354.
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Burr in mind or not. In any case, Burr's victory in New York would have nicely
dovetailed into Pickering's scheme.
The problem, again, was to ascertain, "whether the advantage gained in this
manner will not be more than counterbalanced by fixing on the Northern States a man in
whom the most eminent of our friends will not repose confidence."75 Having conferred
with Rufus King, Roger Griswold himself visited Burr on April 4, 1804, shortly before
the New York election, to get an idea about the vice-president's political stance. To his
apparent relief, Griswold learned that Burr would "administer the Government in a
manner satisfactory to the Federalists." More than that - Burr said that "the northern
States must be governed by Virginia, or govern Virginia - and that there was no middle
76
mode." Though Burr may have been the right man to lead a secessionist drive, as his
subsequent career proved, his defeat in the New York gubernatorial election and deadly
duel with Alexander Hamilton on July 11, 1804, once and for all brought an end to his
cooperation with Federalists.
The secessionist scheme of 1804 evidently became familiar to Hamilton as well. It
was the subject of his very last political thought the day before his death.
"Dismemberment of our Empire," -- he wrote to Theodore Sedgwick (1746-1813) of
Massachusetts, ~ "will be a clear sacrifice of great positive advantages, without any
counterbalancing good; administering no relief to our real Disease; which is
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DEMOCRACY, the poison of which by a subdivision will only be the more concentered
in each part, and consequently the more virulent."77
One ofNew England regions where sectionalism especially prospered was the
Connecticut River Valley. Though David H. Fischer does not observe secessionist
feelings in the Valley until the embargo years,78 such sentiment flourished already in
1803-1804. Anti-Southern and anti-Western articles followed one another in almost every
issue of the Hampshire Gazette. This time, unlike in 1801, the Connecticut Valley was
gaining a real sense of its importance in New England and national politics. A certain
"Detector" observed, specially for the Gazette: "The County of Hampshire may be
considered an important section of Massachusetts, which is the most important state in
New England, and New England is the only remaining barrier to withstand the desolation
of democracy and the madness of innovation."79 In his next piece, protesting against the
Republican dismissal of Federalist officers from national posts, Detector squarely
declared that this policy might lead to the dissolution of the Union:
Let the prevailing "sect" pause and consider seriously ~ whether the persecutions
against the multitude of meritorious officers in the U. States, connected with their
general principles and measures; will not eventually lead to the same unhappy
consequences ~ the dissolution of the Republic!... The progress to our dissolution
may be slow, but it is not the less sure. A poison may be administered that will be
hardly perceptible in its operation; but the effect is inevitable death.
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In the same issue of the Gazette, "Nestor" ~ again a local author ~ submitted his
transparent "Observations" to "the candid consideration of the Citizens ofNew England":
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It rests with the well informed, well principled farmers, mechanics and merchantsofNew England to confound the baneful purpose and secure safety & freedom o
head erf
1
" my ^ break the Rent'sd. Ca eless indifferency and slothful apathy will forge for us chains which it
will not be in our power to break. Whether we are to be free, or by the demolition
of our constitutional barriers, under the mock pretence of more liberty, to become
the slaves of the lordly planters and negro drivers of the South is the question
I his question is in your power to answer which way you please. At present we are
our own masters.
The "lordly planters and negro drivers of the South" or "full-blooded Virginia whiskey
boys" typified the epithets that New England Federalists poured on their Republican
opponents in 1804. Party rhetoric was sharper and more dangerous, verging on invective,
compared to the earlier boom of sectionalism in 1801. In addition, sectional propaganda
in 1803-04 did not derive exclusively from such centers of political life as Boston or
Hartford, but came from more diffuse sources.
On June 27, 1804, the Hampshire Gazette informed its readers of a "Highly
Important Notion" made by "Mr. Ely, of Springfield" in the Legislature of Massachusetts.
In essence, William Ely suggested Massachusetts Senators in the national Congress to try
to obtain a repeal of the "3/5 Clause" by the means of a constitutional amendment, "so
that the Representatives be appointed among the several States according to the number
of their Free Inhabitants respectively."82 The Massachusetts legislature did recommend
such an amendment to other states in 1804, although unsuccessfully. What is important,
though, is the logic with which Ely, himself from Connecticut Valley, supported his
motion. "A Union of the States," - he said, ~ "...cannot, harmoniously, exist for a long
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period, unless it be founded on principles, which shall secure to all free citizens, equal
political rights and privileges in the government..."83 Again, a threat of disunion was
introduced to give additional strength to a political maneuver.
The question of disunion was addressed in detail in an article from the Balance,
reprinted in the Gazette on July 4, 1804. Remarkable was the author's logic. "A
Federalist" started with denying any relationship between the Federalists and the idea of
dismembering the union of American states. Just the opposite, he said; it was Republicans
who contemplated such a base and treacherous act, in case they met with staunch
opposition to their despotism. Then, the author asserted, the Republican idea was to
implement disunion and to blame it upon the Federalists, for which purpose they started
the whole campaign of accusations beforehand, to prepare the public opinion for such a
course of events. Here an interesting evolution happened to the author's rationale. He
enumerated instances of Virginia's despotism over the last few years, adding such
imaginary ones as a pending constitutional amendment that would forever secure
Presidency for a Virginian. Then he inquired angrily:
What, I ask, is to be the consequence of these things? Will the northern states
view them with indifference? Will they submit cheerfully and without murmuring
to these unequal measures?
To which he answered readily:
...In all probability, the northern states will not cheerfully submit. They will
complain ~ they will remonstrate. ~ Judging from the spirit now manifested by
the anti-federalists, we may suppose that these complaints will be treated with
coolness and neglect, if not with insolence. Hence the resentment ofNew England
will be enkindled. Animosities and contentions may follow. Open hostility and a
• r* i 84
dissolution of the union, we fear, may be the dreadful consequence!
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ves a
In late 1803, Timothy Pickering argued similarly to justify the separation ofNew
England in letters to his Federalist colleagues. The task for the one who envisioned
disunion was simply to blame the opposing political party for creating a situation in
which further coexistence of Northern and Southern states in the Union was impossibl
Since the fault now lay exclusively on the Republicans, Federalists ensured themsel
carte-blanche with which, theoretically speaking, they would be able to go very far.
In practice, of course, they did not. The Louisiana Purchase, persecution ofjudges
and even amendments of the Constitution were simply not enough to create secessionist
movement in New England; most Federalists realized that. As for radicals and extremists
like Pickering, the Burr-Hamilton duel seems to have produced a cooling effect even on
them. On July 25, 1 804, the same Hampshire Gazette came out in mourning frames,
notifying its readers of Hamilton's death. The tone of obituaries did not leave room for
doubt about the authors' nationalist allegiances. After Hamilton's death, whatever
sectional and secessionist fervor existed among New England Federalists, gradually
subsided. Through early 1 805 they continued to cast aspersions at Virginian tyrants and
Western backwoodsmen, but these occasions became infrequent and finally almost totally
disappeared.
The second outburst of regionalism was much stronger than the first one. Whereas
in 1801 sectional rhetoric was relatively mild, in 1803-04 it became harsh and militant.
For the first time an actual scheme of Northern secession emerged among key Federalist
leaders. The party press printed a surprisingly large number of articles that pushed a hard
36
sectionalist line, sometimes verging on secessionists Such articles now appeared not
only in major political centers, but also in the borderlands. Local authors, such as
"Nestor" and "Detector," actively participated in political discussions. The overall
intensity and vividness of sectional propaganda was much more forceful in 1804 than in
1 801
.
However, the second surge subsided exactly as the first one. In 1 804-05, a pattern
similar to that of late 1801 - early 1802 repeated - a flow of sectional feeling was
followed by its total ebb.
1.3. The Third Surge: Embargo
The third wave came in 1808. During 1805, 1806, and 1807, practically no traces
of once militant sectional resentment were noticeable in New England. Federalism was
breaking in the region. The party was in crisis and under heavy Republican pressure. In
April, 1 807, after eight years of consecutive Federalist victories, Caleb Strong lost
Massachusetts gubernatorial elections to William Sullivan; for the first time the
governor's chair in Massachusetts was occupied by a Republican. The once aggressively
regionalist newspapers like the Hampshire Gazette seemed to have despaired of their
party's ability to gain the upper hand over Republicans. Federalist periodicals devoted
most of their attention to the war in Europe, keeping grave silence about the situation at
home. Some of the more pessimistic already started to lose all hope, when news from
Washington breathed new life into the party. In January 1 808, newspapers notified their
readers about the December 22, 1807, congressional decision to impose an embargo on
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the foreign sea trade of the United States of America in retaliation against the commercial
depredations of England and France.
The result was predictable. To cut out the principal asset ofNew England
economy unavoidably meant giving a badly needed trump to the Federalist opposition.
The party rose from its slumbers. On January 6, 1808, the Hampshire Gazette
proclaimed:
All the letters from Washington announce a war with Great Britain as nearly
inevitable. The Embargo was carried by the influence of a spirit hostile to Great
Britain, and of course not very independent of France. If the people ofNew
England quietly submit to the system of attaching our fate to that of France, our
independence is at an end. 85
This time, unlike before, a real blow was inflicted upon the vital interests ofNew
England, even though its inner regions, like the Connecticut Valley, were perhaps less
affected by the embargo than the great commercial centers of the New England seacoast.
Nevertheless, the hinterland awakened as well. On March 23, 1808, the Hampshire
Gazette published a memorial of the inhabitants of Northampton, Massachusetts, to the
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States. The document prepared by the
town selectmen drew a frightening picture of total chaos and distress that the embargo
caused in New England:
...Commercial enterprize... are palsied a numerous class of individuals,
heretofore employed in navigation, are deprived of the only means by which they
obtained bread for themselves and their families,... many of them are thrown back
upon the interior, in a state of wretchedness which no description can equal...
Bankruptcies are continually occurring in our great towns, which spread their
effects and produce bankruptcies in the country, which again branch out and
extend their disastrous consequences to the door of almost every citizen. The
farmer is unable to find a market for his surplus produce... His hopes of an
HG, 6 January 1808.
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honorable and needful reward for the toils of the last reason are defeated his
St^r f;
i
4rd his laborious industiy checked * the^ aspects ofthe nature. From these discouraging and ruinous effects of the laws above
mentioned, your memorialists pray that reliefmay be granted. 86
The standard Federalist charges against the Jeffersonian administration during the
Embargo were partiality to France and a conspiratorial design to ruin Northern
commerce. William Ely, who four years before had suggested a constitutional
amendment repealing the 3/5 clause, wrote in the Gazette:
...A more satisfactory explanation of this business [the embargo]... is, that it is an
experiment, which I apprehend has been long contemplated, and which is now to
be made, to prostrate the navigating interests of the United States; to adopt what
the Virginians call the Terrapin policy;... to change the whole country, and
especially the Commercialists at the Northward, into Agriculturalists and
Manufacturers, and like the Chinese, to suffer foreign Nations to come and take
off our surplus produce. 87
was
On April 22, 1808, another town meeting ofNorthampton reiterated Ely's opinion. It
stated that the embargo bore "the semblance of a permanent arrangement, which will
annihilate the prosperity ofNew England, and subject the inhabitants to multiform and
dreadful calamities."
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The meeting, chaired by Asahel Pomeroy, resolved to send a full
representation to the next General Court of Massachusetts, "composed of men, who with
a single eye to their country's good, shall labour to redress our grievances, and restore to
our national councils the ancient and proper influence ofNew England."89
HG . 23 March 1808.
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The same happened in other parts of the region. This time the situation was
becoming truly critical. Federalist theoreticians once harmlessly speculating about
disunion now received powerful reinforcement from popular opinion that already placed
itself in opposition to the national government and was beginning to imbibe the
threatening idea ofNew England unity. The necessary conditions of separation, about
which Federalist leaders wrote to Pickering in 1804, had materialized.
The ail-too familiar subject of disunion revived in the fall. On September 28,
1 808, the Hampshire Gazette reprinted from the Columbian Centinel an article entitled,
"A Separation of the States; and Its Consequences to New England." Justice requires me
to say that the article squarely rejected the idea of separation as "disastrous." However, in
striking resemblance to the piece written by "A Federalist" in 1 804 (see above), this one,
signed "Falkland," blamed all the national and New England calamities on Virginia.
Besides, again, like Pickering or "A Federalist" four years before, "Falkland" did not
exclude the possibility of disunion, saying - exactly like his predecessors had said -- that
if disunion occurred, it would be caused and implemented by the South unwilling to
coexist with New England in one nation:
...From the great revolution in political sentiment which has already taken place in
New England, we confidently believe the old order of things under which we
grew and flourished will be restored. ... In that event we shall again be threatened
with a dissolution of the union. Much as this is to be deprecated, it cannot be
expected that Virginia, proud and aspiring as she has always been, and
accustomed for eight years to govern, will be contented to be governed by the
constitution. If then Virginia, with the states south of the Potomac withdraw from
the confederacy, New England will be compelled to maintain herself as an
independent State.
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New Englanders were swiftly running out of patience. On Thursday, January 12, 1809, "a
very numerous and respectable meeting of the inhabitants of the different towns in the
County of Hampshire" declared openly that the prolongation of the embargo tended "to
produce a most calamitous event - a Dissolution ofthe Union.-91 To the dismay and fury
of thousands of people in the Northeast, they learned that on January 9, Thomas Jefferson
approved another statute enforcing the embargo. The Hampshire Gazette published it in
mourning frames, in an obituary-like form, mockingly announcing the funeral of
* 92American liberty. A tempest of fury rolled through New England. On January 23, 1 809,
a Boston town meeting proclaimed this government act unconstitutional and refused to
93
comply. Republican governor Levi Lincoln warned the General Court against
secessionist projects. The Federalist-controlled General Court angrily denied any such
designs, and Senate and the House pledged their allegiance to the integrity of the Union.
However, this union being "a confederation of equal and independent states with limited
powers," the delegates declared that it was legally possible and necessary at all times for
states to dispute the constitutionality of a federal government act, no matter how critical
the situation was:
We cannot agree with your Honor that in a free country there is any stage at
which the constitutionality of an act may no longer be open to discussion and
debate; at least it is only upon the high road to despotism that such stages can be
found.
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The House remarked that the embargo had "borne most heavily and unequally on the
northern and commercial States." The enforcement act was said to violate "the first
principles of civil liberty, and the fundamental provisions of the Constitution."95 In
January
- February 1809, special town meetings convened all over Massachusetts, from
Boston to the Berkshires. All of them proclaimed the new embargo measures
unconstitutional and squarely refused to comply.96 Petitions from towns poured in
torrents into the General Court, where they were considered by a joint committee of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The committee made its report with resolutions
on the enforcement act on February 1, 1809, whereupon the Senate adopted this
document on February 1 1 by a vote of 19 to 18. The House concurred on February 15, by
a vote of 205 to 139. The first resolution proclaimed the act of the federal government
"in many respects, unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the
citizens of this state." The General Court expressed a willingness to "zealously co-operate
with any other states... for procuring... amendments to the constitution of the United
States... to obtain protection and defence for commerce, and to give to commercial states
their fair and just consideration in the government of the Union." In conclusion, the
committee gravely wished "to rescue our common country from impending ruin, and to
preserve inviolate the union of the states," -- implying that the union might very well
disintegrate in the nearest future. In Federalist-controlled Connecticut, Governor
Ibid., 31.
HG . 25 January, 1, 8, 15, 22 February 1809.
State Documents on Federal Relations . 34-36.
42
Jonathan Trumbull ( 1 740- 1 809) convened the General Assembly to a special session in
February 1809. Addressing the delegates, Trumbull firmly advocated the doctrine of state
interposition:
Whenever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed bounds of their
constitutional powers, on the State legislatures, in great emergencies, devolves the
arduous task - it is their right - it becomes their duty, to interpose their
protecting shield between the right and liberty of the people, and the assumed
power of the General Government. 8
The Assembly confirmed the unconstitutionality of the embargo enforcement act and
agreed with their Massachusetts colleagues "that it is expedient to effect certain
alterations in the constitution of the United States."99
Meanwhile, the political climate was swiftly deteriorating. On February 22, 1809,
another Hampshire County meeting was held in Northampton, Massachusetts, "for the
purpose of taking into consideration the alarming and ruinous situation of our national
affairs." The participants grimly observed that they would "use all lawful exertions for
maintaining the integrity of the Union, and the Constitution of the United States" -- a
statement with a considerable flavor of pessimism about the probability of maintaining
those benefits.
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One could judge how serious the situation was by the fact that reporting
about the meeting, the Hampshire Gazette published an article entitled, "Spirit of '76" in
the same issue.
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New England, it was clear that the conflict between the region and the national
government had significantly intensified.
It is not altogether clear why, but the Federalists who had in 1804 spoken about
the desirability of secession, remained surprisingly passive during the entire embargo
crisis. Seemingly, what they desired so much - a popular resentment against the federal
government
- at last emerged in New England. And still, despite a huge wave of mass
anti-government protest, no discussion about separation was generated in the top
Federalist circles in 1808-09, no matter how close they came to it. Some of the more
militant party leaders noticed and deplored this lack of energy. Christopher Gore (1758-
1827) wrote to Timothy Pickering in December 1808:
Notwithstanding the remarks from some of your chaste orators and supple
courtiers, the mass of the people of this State [Massachusetts] are much more
daring in their means and measures of opposition to the imbecile and profligate
men who have disgraced our councils, and degraded our nation, the last eight
years, than the persons whom they please to style their leaders. 102
One cannot say, though, that their activities were entirely fruitless. It was during the
embargo period that the idea of a large-scale Federalist convention emerged. The
authorship probably belonged to Harrison Gray Otis (1765-1848), a bright and urbane
young Boston Federalist whose energy, eloquence and guile early propelled him to the
top of politics - he became member of the U. S. House of Representatives in 1797, at the
age of thirty-two. In 1808, amidst the havoc produced by the embargo, Otis suggested a
national Federalist convention for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the
upcoming presidential elections. While discussing this measure, some members of the
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party did so in clearly sectionalist terms. Egbert Benson (1746-1833)
, a prominent New
York lawyer and Federalist of the Old School, wrote to Otis on July 13, 1808:
As to the time of the Meeting I suppose about the 20th of Sept will be as
convenient as any, and I think it will be a great Print to have Philadelphians come
to Boston as the Head Quarters of the northern Combination - This CombinationWe shall sooner or later have to avow, not only as requisite to promote and
preserve our Commerce, but the Representation enjoyed by the Slave States
beyond their fit Proportion, has rendered it indispensable to maintain a due
Northern Preponderance in the Administrations of the Government - The
Distinction between the northern, or commercial, and the southern, States exists
in Nature, has from the Beginning influenced the measures of the Government
unfortunately too favorable for the latter, and there is no Alternative left but
openly to meet and resist the Influence, in short I promise myself much Good
from the proposed Meeting, and trust I shall never grudge the time I have given to
effect it.
The nominating convention did take place in 1808, and the relative success of this
measure must have persuaded Otis to employ it in future for other Federalist purposes,
the foremost of which was relief from the embargo. On December 15, 1808, he wrote
Josiah Quincy (1772-1864), a Bostonian and member of the U. S. House of
Representatives from Massachusetts, to ask if it was possible "to propose... the
appointment of delegates
,
to meet those from the other commercial States in convention
at Hartford or elsewhere, for the purpose of providing some mode of relief that may not
be inconsistent with the union ofthese States, to which we should adhere as long as
possible."
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These words exactly ~ to the point that even the same place was suggested -
- predicted the arrangement of the future Hartford Convention of 1814-1815, which was
to a considerable extent initiated by Otis.
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In general, though, despite the extremely favorable conditions. Federalist leaders
remained amazingly sluggish and slow to coordinate any sectional resistance - let alone
secessionist initiative
- throughout the embargo months. Even such radicals as Timothy
Pickering did not put forward any such program. All Pickering did was enter into a
remarkably friendly and amiable correspondence with G. H. Rose, British minister at
Washington. The two kept up correspondence for several months, and Pickering notably
frequently spoke in favor of the Anglo-American rapprochement. New England disunion
was not mentioned, though. 105
In general, Britain paid considerable attention to affairs in New England states
during the embargo. In 1 808-09, there were at least two considerable British agents
operating in New England, one of them the notorious John Henry whose reports State
Secretary James Monroe later bought, and President Madison presented to Congress in
1812 as a proof of a separatist conspiracy among New England Federalists. Madison was
unable to prove anything, though, for Henry did not mention a single name in his letters.
However, the agent did not deny the possibility ofNew England secession in future,
stating that the majority of the population regarded government commercial policy in
highly negative terms.
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The other, less famous but possibly more useful agent was John
Howe (1754-1835), a Boston loyalist printer who fled to Halifax at the time of the general
evacuation on March 1 7, 1 776, then took part in the war on the British side and later
became postmaster-general of the Maritime Provinces in Canada. During the embargo,
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Howe made two trips to the United States, in April - September, 1808, and in November
1808 -January 1809. 107 Before his seeond trip, Howe received explicit instructions from
Sir George Prevost, lieutenant-governor ofNova Scotia and future invader of the
Champlain Valley in 1814. Item 17 of the instructions read:
No. 17. Ascertain in which proportion each State has suffered in consequence of
the General Embargo, and how each state is disposed as to the propriety of
continuing that Measure, also whether there is any probability if the Embargo
should be persevered in by the General Congress of the Country, that it would be
openly resisted by any and which of the States, enquire whether it is apprehended
that a resistance to the Embargo would probably lead to a separation of the United
States, whether a separation is wished by any political [party], or by any State in
particular, whether a separation is considered as an event very injurious to the
Country at large.
108
Howe's answer (most probably written in January 1809) mentioned "Mr. Quincy, Mr.
Pickering, Mr. Hillhouse, Mr. White and Mr. Lloyd 109" as the foremost spokesmen for
the suffering states. As on the embargo, he wrote:
The pressure of this ill judged measure has been felt severely in every part of the
Union; however the Eastern States which have been so largely concerned in
Shipping, and had by their enterprize obtained the largest proportion of the
carrying trade, are the severest sufferers: And if our Government should not be
disposed to let them out of their own Trap, and the Government ofAmerica
should continue the present system, not a doubt can be entertained, but that a
separation of the Eastern States will ensue.
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Thomas Jefferson signed the aet repealing the embargo and replacing it with a much
milder Non-Intercourse Act. The nightmare for New England ended.
During the embargo crisis, the Federalists in New England displayed considerable
cohesion at the lower level of party activities. Numerous town and county meetings, as
well as multiple publications railed against the policies of the federal government, and for
the first time showed the party as a relatively well-organized and effective political force
conscious of its own power. Sectional, and at times secessionist rhetoric frequently
appeared in local newspapers and pamphlets. The reason for this efficiency of the lower
party level was probably not so much the result of Federalist party reorganization as
popular resentment against governmental commercial restrictions.
One should not overestimate the threat of secession, of course. Newspaper and
pamphlet rhetoric, as well as the language of town meetings, point to the fact that
Federalists still preferred political solutions to the problem of Southern power.
Nevertheless, the embargo marked a new step in the development ofNew England
regionalism. Having severely hit the New England economy, it provoked an active grass-
roots sectional movement, which for the first time presented a certain potential danger to
the Union. This popular movement was not matched by a corresponding activity of the
Federalist leaders. For the reasons which are yet to be clarified, leading New England
Federalists of 1808-1809 did not produce any secessionist scheme ~ not even a
discussion about the possibility of disunion ~ similar to that of 1803-1804. Indeed, the
picture reversed itself ~ in 1 804 there were secessionist leaders without popular support.
In 1 808-09 such a support was there, but not Federalists willing to use it. It is hard to say
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how events would have developed had the embargo not been repealed. One fact is
obvious: the outburst of resistance to the embargo demonstrated to the Federalists how
strong the New England sectional cause could be, and how their party could capitalize
on it.
1.4. The Fourth Surge: War of 1812
One cannot call the time between the repeal of the embargo and the beginning of
the war against Great Britain (March 1809 - June 1812), quiet years in national politics.
Trade restrictions were still operative for the most part of this period, and Federalist-
Republican struggle in Massachusetts was in full force. Still, little sectional rhetoric
appeared in those years in the Federalist press. The fourth wave of sectionalism did not
come until the eve of the war.
On April 4, 1812, Congress laid another embargo on the sea trade of the United
States -- this time for a limited period of ninety days. Federalists in the North invariably
interpreted this measure as preparation for war. Party organization and coordination had
improved immensely during the last twelve years, especially during the embargo, and
everyone seems to have known what to do. In May 1812, newspapers reprinted an
"Address to the People of the Eastern States" from the New York Herald. The author,
under the pseudonym "Cassandra," foretold war against Great Britain and predicted grave
consequences for America. The war, he said, would be conducted in actual alliance with
France and would end in the enslavement of the United States by that power. The only
49
way out was, predictably, Northern opposition to the Virginian tyranny that was pushing
the country into an aggressive and ruinous war:
People of the Northern States!... You hold the destinies of our country But a
moment more is allowed you to lift your voice against these destructive measures
But a moment more and the reign of terror is begun.. - Will you be governed by
the ruinous policy of Virginia? Shall the suffrages of a nation of slaves strip you
naked, cover you with infamy, nay, plunge you deep in everlasting perdition'? 111
On the very eve of the war, the Hampshire Gazette published a series of letters "To the
Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" by Timothy Pickering. Nine years after
his first plan of disunion, he came back to the idea:
Massachusetts is the most commercial state in the Union. COMMERCE... is our
life. We cannot exist, but in misery, without COMMERCE. To establish
COMMERCE, to give it SECURITY; and obtain from it a bountiful REVENUE,
were primary objects in forming a national government. COMMERCE with its
revenue was looked up to as the greatest cement of the union of the States. Let the
national government destroy COMMERCE, and the UNION will be
DISSOLVED. 112
With such sentiments New England entered the Anglo-American war that started two
weeks later. We do not intend a complete political history ofNew England during the
War of 1812 here; this has been performed by others. Ours is the more modest objective
of sketching the development of sectional feelings in the region.
Very soon after the war had started, a wave of town meetings rolled again through
New England. One of the strongest anti-war movements was observed in the Connecticut
Valley. On July 15, 1812, a Hampshire County convention of 56 towns firmly
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ess
condemned the war, wished its speedy termination, and gravely intimated at the hapl
perspectives that the war presented to American national unity:
A supposed common interest is, in the apprehension of your Memorialists the
basis of the Federal Union; and if, in consequence of the proceedings of the
government, any particular section of our country should be induced to consider
its own interests as sacrificed to aid the ambition or appease the jealousy of other
sections, it cannot and it ought not to be concealed, that by the habitual
indulgence of such feelings, which measures partial in their effects cannot fail to
produce, the Union itself would eventually be endangered. 113
Practically every issue of the Hampshire Gazette throughout 1812-1814 contained anti-
war materials that almost always bore a sectional tint. "Why should we engage in a war,
in which we have every thing to lose, and nothing to gain; a war which is unnecessary
and unjust, and which must inevitably terminate in the destruction of the commerce and
the prosperity of the New England States?" - a reprint from the Connecticut Courant
asked.
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The idea of a Southern-French conspiracy also proved to be vivid. The
Hampshire Gazette declared:
Away then with the idle and wicked pretence that the war is prosecuted for the
protection of commerce. No fellow-citizens, it is prosecuted to break down the
ardor ofNew England enterprize, to dry up the sources of her prosperity, to
humble the lofty spirit of her independence, to destroy her influence in the
national confederacy, to annihilate commerce, and to make us parties in the
continental system of Napoleon.
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Starting in early 1813, secession talk intensified. It followed the same rhetorical pattern
as in previous cases: the South was pushing the otherwise nationalist and patriotic New
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England toward splitting the Union; therefore it was the South who was truly responsible
for a would-be disunion. "We must no longer be deafened by senseless clamors about a
Separation of the States," - the author of an article in the Centinel exclaimed. "It
event we do not desire... BUT THE STATES ARE SEPARATED IN FACT, when
section assumes an imposing Attitude, and with a high hand, perseveres in measures fatal
to the interests and repugnant to the opinion of another section... If this Separation in fact
takes place, it will be the work ofthe present Cabinet " U(l
Such feeling grew stronger and stronger. As it gradually became clear that the
was to be neither quick nor successful, New England Federalists became increasingly
resentful of the national government. In January, 1814, Northampton and Hatfield,
Massachusetts, held town meetings that once more remonstrated against the war, the
embargo, the admission of new states into the Union, and so on. This time, however,
petitions were sent not to Congress but to the General Court of Massachusetts, --
symbolic perhaps of a remarkable loss of trust in the national authority. The language of
the petitioners testified that their patience was wearing out:
Convinced as we are, that the present state of things proceeds from a disposition,
hostile to Commerce, or a criminal indifference to the interests ofNew England,
and probably from both causes united, we cannot forbear to look to the
Legislature of this Commonwealth for redress. From Congress we do not expect,
nor will we ask relief. Our repeated petitions to that body have been disregarded,
and our grievances seem to have been multiplied in proportion to our
complaints.
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In order to preserve the Union (and intimating that this would be the only way of doing
it), the petitioners suggested amending those parts of the Constitute that disadvantaged
the Northeast and favored the South. The amendments were to be elaborated and then
suggested to Congress "by a convention of delegates from the Northern and Commercial
States, to be appointed by their respective Legislatures." 118 Thus the idea of what a few
months later became the Hartford Convention, came to light. This does not mean that the
project originated from the Hampshire County. Federalist leaders expressed the idea of a
such convention several years before, and almost literal coincidence of ideas expressed in
Northampton and Hadley petitions (the idea of a convention as well) suggest previous
coordination "from above."
This was a time when blue lights were burned along the coasts of Connecticut to
warn the British squadron that the Stephen Decatur was trying to break through the
blockade. Henry Edward Napier, a lieutenant in H. M. S. Nymphe that took part in the
1814 blockade of the Massachusetts coast, wrote scornfully in his diary about New
Englanders:
9 June. ... Received vegetables and stock of all kinds from Boston, green peas for
the first time. Newspapers and in short anything we choose to send for, is brought
by these rascals. No occasion to use force, a hint quite sufficient and frequently
even that is not wanting.
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As for the Federalist leaders, old and young, they gradually started to regard disunion as a
real possibility. Pickering wrote ~ eagerly, perhaps ~ in July 1812:
v
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I would preserve the Umon of the States, if possible.... But 1 would no, be deludedby a word. To my ears there is no magic in the sound of Union. If the great objects
of umon are utterly abandoned, - much more, if they are wantonly, corruptly and
treacherously sacnficed by the Southern and Western States, - let the Union be
severed.
This time, though, Pickering stepped forward with a new version of secession. The North
could secede from the rest of the country, he said, but the rupture would be permanent
only with the new, Western states, whereas the South would later eagerly rejoin the
confederacy. This idea was supported by John Lowell (1769-1840), perhaps the most
prolific Federalist writer in New England and the author of the most popular anti-war
pamphlet, Mr. Madison 's War (1812). Lowell even devoted a special pamphlet to the
scheme of Western separation. 121 This idea perhaps made more sense than one could
imagine, since there was evidence from Louisiana that a considerable portion of the
French and Spanish population of that region, which obviously prevailed over the
American element, was in favored separation from the United States. 122
There were others, like the extravagant Gouverneur Morris (1752-1816) who
started to speak about "a Star in the East."
123
Samuel Fessenden, Timothy Bigelow,
Francis Blake, Charles Prentiss and other radicals started to propose secession more or
less openly.
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For the purposes of this work, however, it is more interesting to consider
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the main, governing body ofNew England Federalists and their attitude to the idea of the
Union. To do so, it is imperative to analyze the central event in the development ofNew
England regionalism of the early 1 800s - the Hartford Convention.
That and Adjacent Towns (Brookfield, 1813), 10; John Lowell, Thoughts in a Series of Letters, in Answer
to a Question Respecting the Division of the States. By a Massachusetts Farmer ( n. p., 1813): 10, 14-16,
18, 22; Charles Prentiss, New England Freedom: A Poem Delivered Before the Washington Benevolent
Society, in Brimfield. February 22d
r
1813 (Brookfield. 1813): 14. 27-28: Inquiry into the Object and
Tendency of the Present War Addressed to the Citizens of New Hampshire (Portsmouth. 1814), 12; John S.
J. Gardiner. A Discourse Delivered at Trinity Church. Boston, July 23. 1812 (Boston. 1812), 19; [John
Lowell], Perpetual War
T
the Policy of Mr. Madison (Boston. 1812), 89.
CHAPTER 2
THE HARTFORD CONVENTION AND CALEB STRONG'S INITIATIVE
The Hartford Convention is arguably one of the most mysterious events in
American history. Rarely has a political forum caused such diametrically opposite
opinions about its very purpose or aroused so much suspicion, accusation, and gossip.
The problem is that right after the Convention, in February 1815, came the news of the
Treaty of Ghent with Great Britain. This unexpected "happy end" radically changed the
political situation in the United States, unleashing a burst of nationalist feeling. Many
Americans now started to think of the "most unpopular American war," as Samuel Eliot
Morison has called the War of 1812, as a glorious national struggle. The Federalist party,
just weeks before on the rise due to its anti-war rhetoric, now fell into disrepute, to which
their Republican opponents were more than eager to add a flavor of treason. The Hartford
Convention played a key role in this propaganda scheme.
The Convention was organized at the end of 1814 by New England Federalists in
response to the exigencies of the moment. Madison's latest embargo (December 17, 1813
-- April 14, 1814) and the British naval blockade (since April 25, 1814) had seriously
impaired the economy ofNew England. In July 1814, Lieutenant-Colonel Pilkington and
six hundred British soldiers landed at Eastport, Maine. In August, Lieutenant-General Sir
John Coape Sherbrooke, the Governor ofNova Scotia at the head of two thousand
Britons, captured Penobscot and soon took possession of Bangor without much
resistance. All Maine east of the Penobscot river was in British hands. Male citizens were
required to take an oath of allegiance to George III, which they did, showing "no
55
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unwillingness to remain permanently British subjects." 125 War came to New England.
With only about six hundred regular American troops in Massachusetts, defense of the
region fell to state militia.
Never before (and maybe, never after) had the federal government been so weak.
On August 24-25, 1814 the British army captured and burned Washington. Military
failures, financial bankruptcy, clashes with the states - all contributed to the increasing
instability of the Madison administration of James Madison. Government
counter-measures, such as the Fall 1814 militia draft projects and the authorization of the
enlistment of minors without parental or guardian's consent, caused mass resentment and
indignation in New England. Federalists, in their turn, gladly exploited popular
exasperation to their own purposes.
On October 17,1814 the General Court of Massachusetts suggested to other New
England state legislatures to send spokesmen to a common convention. The aim of this
measure was stated as follows:
To meet and confer with Delegates from the other states ofNew England, or any
of them upon the subjects of their public grievances and concerns, and upon the
best means of preserving our resources and of defence against the enemy, and to
devise and suggest for adoption by those respective states, such measures as they
may deem expedient; and also to take measures, if they shall think proper, for
procuring a convention of Delegates from all the United States, in order to revise
the constitution thereof, and more effectually to secure the support and attachment
of all the people, by placing all upon the basis of fair representation. 126
Henry Adams, History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson
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The principal Republican indictment against the Federalists after the war was that
the Hartford Convention intended to dissolve the Union. The Federalists asserted the
contrary
-
that the Convention had in mind the benefit of the Union. The great dispute
over whether the Hartford Convention had been separatist or not had some important
political implications in 1814-15: in the course of time, however, it became a matter of
pure scholarly interest. Today most historians tend to deny the separatist character of the
Convention. One ofmy goals is to challenge this prevalent opinion.
The Convention met at the State House in Hartford, Connecticut, during the three
weeks from December 15, 1814, to January 5, 1815. Massachusetts sent twelve
127
delegates; Connecticut dispatched seven; 128 and Rhode-Island was represented by four
129
men. ' New Hampshire and Vermont did not send official delegations. In New
Hampshire, the Federalist-controlled legislature was not in session, and Governor John
Taylor Gilman, although a Federalist too, faced a Republican council that opposed such a
regional assembly. Many leading Federalists in the state, Daniel Webster among them,
also opposed the idea. All this prevented New Hampshire from participation in the
130
Hartford Convention. As to Vermont, its legislature, including both Republicans and
Federalists ~ perhaps under the impression of the British invasion into Champlain Valley
~ refused to participate in the forum. Yet the two latter states were represented thanks to
the work of unofficial assemblies. A "conventional meeting of twenty towns in the
127
George Cabot (elected president of the Convention) , William Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy
Bigelow, Stephen Longfellow, Daniel Waldo, George Bliss, Nathan Dane, Hodijah Baylies, Joshua
Thomas, Joseph Lyman, and Samuel Sumner Wilde.
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county of Cheshire, in the State ofNew-Hampshire" elected Benjamin West delegate of
the Convention. Another New Hampshire meeting, "from most of the towns in the
county of Grafton, and from the town of Lancaster, in the county of Coos" elected Mills
Olcott.
131
Later, on December 28, the last delegate, William Hall, Jr., elected from the
county of Windham, Vermont, joined the sessions.
Thus, twenty-six New England Federalists became delegates of the Hartford
Convention. Theodore Dwight from Connecticut, later the first historian of this assembly,
became its non-voting secretary. For him this was not to be an altogether safe business.
Soon after the Convention started, Dwight received an anonymous letter from Boston
which read as follows:
Boston Dec 15 -- 1814
Sir if in your present Convention you should attack the Union of the States, We
the friends of that Union will feel ourselves justified in repelling the attack by any
means which God and Nature has placed within our reach, and depend upon it Sir
that in the consequent Anarchy your body would soon disfigure a Lamp Post.
Union.
132
Obviously, contemporaries took the possibility of disunion as a result of the
Hartford Convention much more seriously than many present-day historians. The
assembly brought the region to the brink of a civil war.
All the delegates were eminent men ~ renowned lawyers (21 of 26) and
merchants. Most had been delegates of the national Congress or state legislatures before
and, consequently, were well aware of the nature and urgent needs of Federalist politics.
131
"Secret Journal of the Hartford Convention," in Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention.
With a Review of the Policy of the United States Government which Led to the War of 1812. (1833; .
reprint, Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 384.
132
Dwight Family Papers, New York Public Library.
59
Most of them had a political reputation of moderates. On the eve of the Convention, John
Lowell, one of the most radical New England Federalists, wrote a letter to Timothy
Pickering. This document, noted as confidential, has often been cited by historians as a
proof of the Convention's harmlessness. Lowell discussed the characters of the
significant members of the Massachusetts delegation - George Cabot, Harrison Gray
Otis, Timothy Bigelow, William Prescott, Nathan Dane, and Samuel Sumner Wilde. Of
them, he considered only Bigelow to be capable of resolute action:
Bigelow is really bold on the present question, has a just confidence in the power
of Massachusetts, sneers as he ought to (and as I am sure I do) at all the threats of
vengeance of the other states; and, if he was well supported, I have no doubt that
measures of dignity and real relief would be adopted. 133
Others, Lowell thought, were wise and reasonable but hopelessly irresolute. His opinion
of Harrison Gray Otis has been quoted by almost every historian of the Hartford
Convention: "Mr. Otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering - to-day bold and to-
morrow like a hare trembling at every breeze."
134
Lowell was of similar opinion about the
rest of the Massachusetts and Connecticut delegations ~ wise, intelligent but timid and
unable to act. "It is to be regretted that we have not chosen two or three such persons as
Daniel Sargent, William Sullivan, and Colonel Thorndike," - he wrote meaning the
radicals who had not been sent to Hartford.
Lowell was not alone in such an appraisal of the delegates, and there are reasons
to believe that he was right. Indeed, for the most part they were moderates. However,
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even though this might have been true, their political moderation is not a definitive
argument denying a priori the separatism of the Hartford Convention. On the contrary, it
is precisely the moderation of the delegates that makes this assembly so extraordinary.
Radicals were not at the steering wheel ofNew England politics even in 1814, and it
meant little if they favored disunion or not. Political power in New England was in the
hands of moderate Federalists. Behind those who assembled at Hartford stood the
governors and legislatures of three most important New England states, and it was on
them that the future of the region - in particular its official attitude to the Union and the
war - depended.
From the first session the delegates imposed an injunction of utmost secrecy on
the proceedings. The resulting lack of sources directly related to the Hartford Convention
explains why this forum has ever since been shrouded in the veil of mystery. The journal
of the convention had been kept in secret until 1819, when George Cabot submitted it to
the office of the State Secretary of Massachusetts, for public display. The document,
however, turned to be disappointing for sensation-hunters. It was just a record of
meetings and adjournments, with brief references to questions discussed -- a report, an
agenda, appointments, credentials, etc., -- but no record of what was said. There were
neither texts of speeches, nor voting results, nor information about the form of ballot, nor
* 135
any lists of votes pro and contra. The only informative official document that remains.
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therefore, is the final report of the Hartford Convention published in January 1815, right
upon the conclusion of the forum. This text will be crucial to us. 136
A concise document of twenty-five pages of text and twelve pages of supportive
statistics and notes, the report can be subdivided into several logical parts. A six-page
preamble describes the reasons for the convention. The goal of the assembly, the report
read, lay in "devising the means of defence against dangers, and of relief from
oppressions proceeding from the acts of their own Government, without violating
constitutional principles, or disappointing the hopes of a suffering and injured people." 137
The situation was so serious that "no summary means of relief [could] be applied without
recourse to direct and open resistance." However, in the usual Federalist manner of
distrusting the people, the delegates announced that this resistance would inevitably be
painful and dangerous: "Precedents of resistance to the worst administration, are eagerly
seized by those who are naturally hostile to the best." 138 Therefore, the delegates saw
their immediate task in "reconciling all to a course of moderation and firmness, which
may save them from the regret incident to sudden decisions, probably avert the evil, or at
least insure consolation and success in the last resort." 139
The text abounds in national rhetoric. The delegates gave due praise to the
Constitution of the United States, although with clear reservations:
The Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates, from the States of Massachusetts. Connecticut, and
Rhode-Island: the Counties of Cheshire and Grafton, in the State of New-Hampshire: and the County of
Windham, in the State of Vermont: — Convened at Hartford, in the State of Connecticut. December 15th.
1814. (Hartford: Printed by Charles Hosmer, 1815). Despite its misleading title, this publication contained
no proceedings of the Convention.
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The Constitution of the United States, under the auspices of a wise and virtuous
Administration, proved itself competent to all the objects of national prosperity
comprehended in the views of its framers. No parallel can be found in history of atransition so rapid as that of the United States from the lowest depression to thehighest felicity -- from the condition of weak and disjointed republics, to that of a
great, united, and prosperous nation. 140
But the Constitution, however good, was but a paper, insufficient in itself to
provide national happiness. Another indispensable ingredient, delegates asserted, was "a
wise and virtuous Administration." A wrong administration could always abuse even the
best constitution. This was precisely what happened in the United States, the report
contended, for, delegates argued, "this state of public happiness has undergone a
miserable and afflicting reverse, through the prevalence of a weak and profligate policy" -
- the policy of the Republicans.
Apparently, a good administration was one that would cater to Federalist political
and economic interests or, in regional terms, to the interests of the Northeast. The report
warned the public of "the Southern Atlantic States" against ignoring the North:
They [the public in the South] will have felt, that the Eastern States cannot be
made exclusively the victims of a capricious and impassioned policy. -- They will
have seen that the great and essential interests interests of the people, are common
to the South and to the East. They will realize the fatal errors of a system, which
seeks revenge for commercial injuries in the sacrifice of commerce, and
aggravates by needless wars, to an immeasurable extent, the injuries it professes
to redress. The may discard the influence of visionary theorists, and recognize the
benefits of a practical policy.
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The main part of the document described in detail the situation in which New
England states had found themselves by the end of 1 814. First of all, referring to the
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Constitution, the delegates renounced the federal jurisdiction over New England state
militias: "Unless the laws shall be opposed, or an insurrection shall exist, or an invasion
shall be made, Congress, and of consequence the President as their organ, has no more
power over the militia than over the armies of a foreign nation." 142 The report also
attacked government proposals of conscription and the enlistment of minors. It was the
federal government also, it said, that had engaged in an offensive, aggressive war but
abandoned the defense of the states, especially New England that were particularly
vulnerable to attack from the sea. The government did not intend, and was actually
unable, to defend the Eastern states. The latter, therefore, were "left to adopt measures for
their own defence." 143
The delegates continued that it would be impossible for New England economy
ruined by war to pay national taxes together with defraying expenses of self-defense.
Therefore, the report proposed that "these States might be allowed to assume their own
defence, by the militia or other troops. A reasonable portion... of the taxes raised in each
state might be... appropriated to the defence of such state." 144 In other words, New
England would withhold its payments from the federal government.
The report then proceeded from concrete and immediate measures of relief to a
more general discourse about the reasons of the present calamitous situation. The
Washington and Adams administrations were presented as a true paradise:
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The arts flourished - the sciences were cultivated - the comforts and
conveniences of life were universally diffused - and nothing remained for
succeeding administrations, but to reap the advantages, and cherish the resources
flowing from the policy of their predecessors. 145
This idyllic prosperity, the report continued, had ended when Jefferson assumed
presidential power. The two successive Republican administrations had brought the
nation to the point that "while Europe reposes from the convulsions that had shaken down
her ancient institutions, she beholds with amazement this remote country, once so happy
and so envied, involved in a ruinous war, and excluded from intercourse with the rest of
the world."
146
The authors of the report enumerated particularly deplorable aspects of
Republican policy. The first of them read as follows:
...A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a combination among certain
States, by exciting local jealousies and ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders
in one section of the Union, the control of public affairs in perpetual
succession.
147
Other grievances included expulsion of Federalists from official posts;
unconstitutional dismissal of Federalist judges; the abolition of taxes in order to gain
popular favor"; patronage in the distribution of offices; admission of new states into the
Union that "destroyed the balance of power which existed among the original States";
admittance of foreigners to "places of trust, honour, or profit"; erroneous foreign policy
(the error being "hostility to Great Britain and partiality to France"; and, "lastly but
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principally
- A visionary and superficial theory in regard to commerce, accompanied by
a real hatred but a feigned regard to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance to render it
an instrument of coersion and war." 148
Then the delegates contradicted their own previous compliments to the
Constitution of the United States by asserting that all this could have been avoided,
"unless favored by defects in Constitution." They proposed several constitutional
amendments, as "to strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the Union of the States, by
removing the ground of existing jealousies, and providing for a fair and equal
representation and a limitation of powers, which have been misused." 149 This later served
as a good trump for Harrison Gray Otis and other proponents of the non-separatist
character of the convention - they often quoted this passage to support their assertion that
the convention presented no threat to the Union.
The delegates proposed the following seven amendments to the federal
Constitution:
1. The apportionment of both representatives and direct taxes in the states
within the Union according to their respective numbers of free people, "including
those bound to serve for a term of years and excluding Indians not taxed and all
other persons", i.e. the abolition of the "3/5 clause;"
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2. Further admission of new states into the Union only upon the
concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of Congress;
3. The limitation of any future embargo imposed by Congress to sixty
days;
4. Such an embargo can be imposed by Congress only upon the
concurrence of two-thirds of both houses;
5. The same provision for any declaration of war or any "acts of hostility
against any foreign nation." The only exception was made for an actual invasion;
6. An interdiction for naturalized citizens to occupy any civil offices
"under the authority of the United States;"
7. Persons from the same state could not be elected President of the United
States for two terms in succession. Besides, one person could not occupy the
presidential post for more than one term.
The delegates admonished the state legislatures ofNew England to
"protect the citizens of said States from the operation and enforcement of all acts
which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States, which
shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts,
conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the Constitution of the United
States."
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In addition, the convention urged state legislatures to pass laws
authorizing governors or commanders-in-chief of the militia to form special
volunteer detachments to be used upon the request of governors of the other New
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England states "in assisting the State, making such request to repel any invasion
thereof which shall be made or attempted by the public enemy." 151 Finally, in case
of prolonged war in which the Federal government ignored the amendments
proposed at Hartford and disregard the defense ofNew England, the delegates
resolved to summon another convention at Boston "with such powers and
instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require." 152
Thus, no open and direct call for a separation was made. Here we must
agree with the Federalists and those historians who later sided with their
interpretation. Indeed, the text contained several passages of exemplary patriotic,
nationalist rhetoric, which Federalists would later use to justify the convention
and prove its high patriotic spirit. Yet we must look at the text of the report more
attentively.
At the end of the "preamble," the following phrase -- right after the
allusion to the common interest of the North and the South -- immediately draws
the reader's attention:
Finally, if the Union be destined to dissolution, by reason of the multiplied
abuses of bad administrations, it should, if possible, be the work of
peaceable times and deliberate consent.
153
Aside from the very fact that disunion is mentioned as an option, the
words "if possible" are remarkable here. It followed, that "if impossible,"
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separation might not be a result of "peaceable times and deliberate consent," that
is, that secession might take place during the war, right then and there.
A few words after that:
Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and
permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the blindness
of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of
the times; but they may be traced to implacable combinations of
individuals, or of States, to monopolize power and office, and to trample
without remorse upon the rights and interests of commercial sections of
the Union. Whenever it shall appear that these causes are radical and
permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement, will be preferable to an
alliance bv constraint, among nominal friends, hut real enemies, inflamed
bv mutual hatred and jealousy, and inviting by intestine divisions,
contempt, and aggression from abroad. " 154 (emphasis added)
Thus, separation was preferable under certain conditions. The text, though,
goes on to read that "a severance of the Union by one or more States, against the
will of the rest, and especially in a time of the war, can be justified only by
absolute necessity."
155
This argument was even called "conclusive."
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But the
moment when this absolute necessity would come, could be defined very
liberally. And moreover ~ if the reasons against separation were indeed so
conclusive, why was this "absolute necessity" mentioned at all? Why not say that
in wartime any attempt of secession was simply impossible; more than that -
criminal? Why such a reservation?
From the preamble let us turn to the conclusion of the report. The very last
phrase of the document (followed only by resolutions) read:
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"Our nation may yet be great, our union durable. But should this prospect
be utterly hopeless, the time will not have been lost, which shall have
ripened a general sentiment of the necessity of more mighty efforts to
rescue from ruin, at least some portion of our beloved country " 157
(emphasis added).
It is hard to deny that in these words the possibility of secession was stated
clearly and expressly, and more than that, approved. The fact that this phrase was
at the very end of the document, made it still more menacing. This was part of a
pattern. Passages of the report which either stated or implied the potentiality of
secession, were located in the key parts of the text -- either in the preamble or in
the conclusion. Therefore, in spite of all the reverences to the Union and
Constitution, the authors of the report seriously considered secession and found
that perspective not only plausible but, under certain circumstances, even
desirable.
Going further, the amendments which the convention proposed, had few
chances to pass the Congress. The first one meant the abolition of the 3/5 clause,
to which the South would have never consented. The second through fifth
amendments would have limited congressional powers. The sixth amendment (a
ban for naturalized citizens to occupy official posts) would have also hardly been
accepted by the national legislature. As for the seventh amendment, it was clearly
directed against the notorious "Virginia dynasty" and, like the first one, the
Congress would have obviously repudiated it. Thus, all the amendments were
oriented squarely towards the benefit of the North, particularly New England, and
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against the South. By their very nature, they substantially undermined the national
element in the United States and reinforced sectionalism. Despite their pro-New
England character, the amendments presented a universal sectionalist program,
which, as James Banner justly observes, could be - and this proved to be correct
in 45 years -- used by any region determined to secede from the Union. 158
So radically sectionalist they were that one questions if it was a real
legislative initiative or a mere declaration. Most of the delegates were experienced
politicians and could not but realize that their amendments had few chances to
succeed in Congress. Despite the peculiarities of Federalist psychology, they were
rational enough to understand the extremism and impossibility of their proposals.
Sectionalism prevailed not only in the amendments. The alleged main
purpose of the Convention was the defense ofNew England against a "common
enemy." How did the conventioneers resolve this problem? First of all, they urged
the New England states to withhold tax payments from the federal government.
No matter how such funds would have been used, this would have certainly
undermined the general war effort and weakened the national government.
Secondly, the delegates rejected government war measures, such as conscription
and the enlistment of minors. As for militia, the federal government was not
supposed to use it either ~ the militia ought to limit its operations to New England
only. This would have effectively blocked the mobilization efforts of Madison's
administration. Bearing in mind that New England played a crucial role in the
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national revenues and military resources, it is clear that withdrawal of both from
the disposal of the federal government would have seriously hampered the entire
nation's military performance.
On the whole, the essence of the resolution of the defense problem which
the Convention suggested was disunion - the separation of the previously more or
less coordinated action of all states in favor of separate, regional defense projects.
Significant here was the rhetoric of the delegates: "Even at this late hour, let the
government leave to New England the remnant of her resources, and she is ready
and able to defend her territory, and to resign the glories and advantages of the
border war, to those who are determined to persist in its prosecution." 159 This was
a truly separatist, regionalist approach that meant separation from the national war
effort and admittedly, in perspective, from the Union itself.
One can object to this and say that having withdrawn from the war effort,
New England would have still continued to fight on the regional level, to defend
itself against the British. Maybe this is what the conventioneers meant. To answer
this question, the report of the Hartford Convention will not be enough. Let us
consider another remarkable historic document of those davs.
In November 1814, about a month before the Convention, Governor Caleb
Strong of Massachusetts sent an envoy to Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, the
lieutenant-governor ofNova Scotia and the commander of the British forces
which had just captured Castine, Maine. Although the documents related to this
Proceedings . 11.
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mission were published as early as 1938,
160
historians have never given them
attention, with the exception of Samuel Eliot Morison. 161 He, however, did not
consider these papers in connection with the Hartford Convention. This has to be
done.
The name of the envoy has remained unknown upon his own request
(Morison suggests that it was Thomas Adams from Castine). He was "a most
respectable Inhabitant of the Country lying between the Penobscot and the
Boundary Line ofNew Brunswick" and was "personally known" 162 both by
Admiral Griffith and Sherbrooke. Upon returning from Boston to Castine, he
informed the British that he had some important information to convey.
Sherbrooke learned that this man had been "Commissioned by the Executive of
Massachusetts" 163 (i.e. Caleb Strong) to explore the possibility of a separate
agreement between Great Britain and New England states, by which New England
would withdraw from the war. Sherbrooke asked the envoy to state his proposals
on paper and enclosed them with his own message to Earl Bathurst, the British
Secretary for War and the Colonies. Sherbrooke also asked Bathurst to send an
experienced diplomat to Canada to deal with the proposal of Massachusetts chief
executive.
The archival documents of the negotiations between this envoy and the British command were
published by J. S. Martell in the American Historical Review in 1938. See: "A Side Light on Federalist
Strategy During the War of 1812," AHR 43 (October 1937 to July 1938): 553-66.
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The fact that neither General Sherbrooke, nor Admiral Griffith, despite
being the key figures in the British administration in Canada felt themselves
entitled to deal with this person, suggests that for them this was a serious
diplomatic affair, even though the envoy had not presented any written credentials
from Strong, thinking it imprudent to carry such papers. 164 Apparently, there were
reasons
- "the respectable Character of this Person & other Circumstances" 165 -
that convinced the British of the authenticity of the proposal. Both Griffith and
Sherbrooke themselves knew the envoy, which probably influenced their opinion
about his mission.
The agent indeed put Strong's suggestions on paper. They are worth reproducing
at length:
The State of Massachusetts has been actuated by strong desire not only to
prevent the declaration of War by the united [sic] States against great
Britain, but since that declaration has been made to embrace the earliest
opportunity to bring the war to a close: Such circumstances have hitherto
existed as have rendered inexpedient, a direct & decisive effort to
accomplish that desirable object: If however the British Goverment [sic]
does in fact entertain such Sentiments and Views, as the Goverments [sic]
ofNew England have attributed to it, the period is now probably near,
when the War may be brought to a Conclusion, - mutually advantageous to
Great Britain, and to those who may concur in producing that Event. 1
And right after that:
With a view to meet the occasion , the Goverment [sic] of Massachusetts at
its late session, has appointed delegates to assemble at Hartford, in
Connecticut, on the 15th of December 1814, And there to meet such
Delegates from the other New England States, as may be by then
164
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appointed for the purpose contemplated in the appointment of those by
Massachusetts... (emphasis added).
Since this was a diplomatic document, its language was supposed to be
especially precise. One should ask, which "occasion" did Governor Strong and his
colleagues have in mind when they summoned the Hartford Convention? From
the text it follows that it was the occasion to conclude a certain agreement
between Great Britain and New England states which would withdraw New
England from the war. The language of the letter is quite ambiguous. A possible
interpretation is that when Caleb Strong, Harrison Gray Otis and other "moderate"
Federalists initiated the summons of the Hartford Convention, they were, as this
document suggests, contemplating a separate armistice between New England and
Great Britain, which the decisions of the Convention were to prepare the soil for.
The envoy then described the "ostensible" 168 (this word is also remarkable
-- what were the real ones?) objectives of the Convention -- New England defense
measures which the federal government neglected to provide. The agent also
mentioned that the delegates intended to withdraw the payments ofNew England
States from the national treasury in order to appropriate this money to local
defense. Then another remarkable phrase ensued:
It will require no great degree of prescience, to forsee [sic] that this
measure [the withdrawal of payment] forced upon those States by the
conduct of the general Goverment, and the law of self preservation, will
necessarily lead to collision between that Goverment, and these States, and
167
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also that the credit of that Goverment already greatly impaired, and always
founded principally on the basis of Northern revenue, must entirely fail. 169
This was probably as clear to the delegates of the Hartford Convention as
to Caleb Strong and his envoy. If so, they should have prepared for the "collision"
between the Federal government and New England, of which the envoy spoke. In
fact, they really did. In his message the agent said it was possible that a separate
government would be created "in due time... for the States present, and such as
may acceed afterwards, calculated to insure the pursuit of such regular and
legitimate policy, as may afford security to foreign as well as domestic
* 1 70
relations..." The wish of a region to establish its own government independent
of the national cannot be called otherwise than separatism.
Understanding that a clash with the central government loomed, the
legislature of Massachusetts, the agent further said, "has authorized his
Excellency the Governor to levy an Army of 10,000 regular Troops, and probably
a similar measure will be adopted by the other States acceding to the Convention,
according to their ability." It was an important part of the agent's mission to
explore a possibility of getting British aid to New England states in their
resistance to the Federal government:
It is not to be concealed, that possibly, though not probably, the
democracy of some one, perhaps more of the state Governments,
influenced and countenanced, by the Executive of the United States, may
overcome in an Election, the best exertions of well disposed people. It will
be necessary to know whether in an event of that kind, any competent
170
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Military force, can be certainly relied on to be provided hy Great Rritain
ULaMMlhe present authorities of the States, or of such Goverment as "^y
grow put ofmeasures now in operation 172 (emphasis added).
This was not simply separatism ("such Goverment as may grow out of
measures now in operation"). It was separatism conscious of its possible
consequences up to and including civil war. And not simply a civil war, but the
one in alliance with foreign military forces.
Now let us return for a moment to the Report of the Hartford Convention.
Resolution #2 urged New England state legislatures to pass laws authorizing their
governors or commanders-in-chief of state militia to organize special military
units, "well armed, equipped and disciplined, and in readiness for service" which
were to be used "upon the request of the Governour of either of the other States...
in assisting the State, making such request to repel an invasion thereof which shall
be made or attempted by the public enemy." Which "enemy" were these troops
to repel, in the light of what we have just read in the letter of Governor Strong's
agent? The British? Possibly. The letter, however, suggests something different.
In the concluding passages, the agent asked the British officials not to
allow any further depredations on New England coast and, if possible, to
compensate for the damage already inflicted. "If indeed the preservation of good
feelings of the people of this and the adjoining states towards Great Britain be
1 74
thought an object of any importance, depredation must cease on our Shore."
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This was followed by another important phrase: "If that mode of Warfare
[depredations] be thought advisable, it must operate altogether on the South.
Punishment will then be brought Home to the Doors of the guilty. In that Country
the British Goverment and people have no affections to lose." 175
The letter ends with an expression of assurance that the alliance between
the New England states and Great Britain will be mutually beneficial, and with a
reaffirmation of separatist statement:
There is, it is believed little room to doubt, that if these States be left
unmolested, they will soon be able to establish a system of order and
Power, that will paralyze the Authority of the United States, and crush the
baneful Democracy of the Country. The measures now ripening by the
means of the Convention , will soon afford a more decisive and important
view of the ultimate measures proper to be taken by the British
Goverment. 176 (emphasis added).
Upon reading the letters from Sherbrooke and the Massachusetts agent, Earl
Bathurst laid them "before His Royal Highness The Prince Regent" 177 and on the
same day - December 13, 1814 - directed four dispatches to his inferior. Although
peace talks at Ghent were close to conclusion, "in the Event of the War being
unhappily protracted..., — he wrote to Sherbrooke, ~ you have received authority
(and this instruction hereby conveying it) to sign such Armistice on the part of the
178
State of Massachusetts, and of any other States referred to in your dispatch..."
In the event of military clash between New England and the central government,
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Bathurst promised New England to "furnish arms, accoutrements, ammunition,
Clothing, and naval Cooperation, on receiving application to that Effect." 179
Secretary Bathurst also urged Sherbrooke "to concert measures with the military
Commanders... to mitigate in every possible manner the pressure of War, in favor
of all such States as shall have satisfactorily shewn a disposition to conclude an
Armistice with His Majesty..." 180
We do not know who knew about Strong's initiative. After the report of the
Hartford Convention had been published, quite a few Federalists criticized that document
for evasiveness and indecision. However, Timothy Pickering, the most ardent leader of
New England sectionalism, declared that the report bore "the high character of wisdom,
firmness, and dignity." The delegates, he said, "have explicitly pronounced sentence of
condemnation upon a miserable administration... They have made a declaration of
principles [emphasis in text], the landmarks by which legislatures and the people may
direct their course. And they have... manifested a determination to apply those principles
in corresponding measures, when the future conduct or neglects of the government shall
* • 181
require their application." It is worth noticing that Pickering also viewed the measures
proposed by the convention as a mere declaration. And of course, one should pay
attention to the fact that "the chief separatist ofNew England" was contented with the
results of the forum that many of his fellow partisans thought to be so indecisive.
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Nobody knows how the situation would have developed if the war had continued.
Perhaps, the second convention in Boston would have officially proclaimed the
separation ofNew England states from the Union. Perhaps, an armistice between New
England and Great Britain would have been signed, bringing about the probability of a
civil war. But this is speculation. The fact is that peace was indeed at hand. On January
27, 1815, the General Court of Massachusetts appointed, upon hearing the results of the
Hartford Convention, a delegation of three prominent Federalists -- Harrison Gray Otis,
Thomas Handasyd Perkins, and William Sullivan - to present the resolutions of the
convention and the proposed amendments to Congress in Washington. However, soon
after the "ambassadors" had arrived in the capital, news of the Ghent peace treaty with
Britain reached America.
This was the end ofNew England separatism. The Federalist organizers of the
convention now faced a miserable perspective - to spend the rest of their days in self-
justification. A full excuse, however, would never come, and a spot has remained on their
names and deeds, low since.
Thus, the Hartford Convention did present a threat to the union of American
states. The report of the convention contained several clearly separatist passages located
in the key parts of the text. The entire set of constitutional amendments, as well as other
measures proposed by the convention, reflected sectional extremism oriented exclusively
to the benefit ofNew England. Such amendments were by themselves a threat to the
Union, especially at the time of war. The method of resolving the defense problem
actually implied financial as well as military withdrawal ofNew England from the war.
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Therefore, the report, even if we take it at face value, did not contribute to the nationalist
cause. Resistance to the national government and non-recognition of its authority came
from a distinct section of the country. Therefore, the Hartford Convention was a
separatist phenomenon, even ifjudged exclusively by its official documents.
Its separatist sentiment receives further significant confirmation, when
considered in the context of the mission of Governor Strong's agent. Both events
were initiated by the same politicians (to a great extent, by the same person -
Caleb Strong), and took place approximately at the same time. The forthcoming
convention ofNew England delegates was mentioned many times in the letter by
Strong's agent to Lord Bathurst.
More than that, the entire argument of the agent in favor of an alliance
between Great Britain and the New England states was premised on the
Convention itself. The agent stated that it would be summoned in order to meet
the occasion to carry out that agreement between New England and Britain. From
his letter it also follows that the leaders of Massachusetts Federalism who had
initiated the Convention recognized the danger of the measures it was to propose.
They realized the possible outcome of such measures — an open clash between
New England and the Federal government, that would have probably resulted in a
civil war and/or secession ofNew England from the Union. They were ready for
that. Through his plenipotentiary agent, Governor Strong actually offered the
British a military alliance. And the Hartford Convention appears here to have
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been the first but apparently not the last intended official step ofNew England
Federalists on this way of resistance and opposition to the national government.
was on
CHAPTER 3
WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
THE ROOTS AND CHARACTER OF NEW ENGLAND SECTIONALISM
The phenomenon of early 19th-century New England sectionalism deserves
historical explanation. On the one hand, recourse to states' rights was common for a
political opposition in the early Republic. What Federalists did in the early 1800s
their part, consciously or not, a repetition of the maneuver undertaken by their
Republican opponents in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99 - resorting
to state power against the federal government controlled by an opposing party. It is most
interesting to compare the 1799 reaction ofNew England state legislatures to Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions, to the later behavior of Federalists. The legislators of
Massachusetts, while answering to Virginia in February 1799, made it explicit that "they
cannot admit the right of the state legislatures to denounce the administration of that
government to which the people themselves, by a solemn compact, have exclusively
committed their national concerns." "...This legislature," ~ they went on, - "are
persuaded that the decision of all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution of
the United States, and the construction of all laws made in pursuance thereof, are
exclusively vested by the people in the judicial courts of the United States. ...The people,
in the solemn compact, ...have not constituted the state legislatures the judges of the acts
or measures of the Federal Government..."
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Ten years after, though, the General Court radically changed its mind. After
January 9, 1809, when Congress adopted particularly Draconian measures of enforcing
the embargo, Massachusetts legislators proclaimed themselves not only eligible but
obligated to discuss the acts of the federal government and their constitutionality. The
House of Representatives declared to Levi Lincoln, the Republican governor of the state:
We cannot agree with your Honour that in a free country there is any stage at
which the constitutionality of an act may no longer be open to discussion and
debate; at least it is only upon the high road to despotism that such stages can be
found.
183
In pursuance of this principle, the legislature of Massachusetts proclaimed the January 9,
1809, act of Congress "in many respects, unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not
legally binding on the citizens of this state."
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Thus, in 1809 Massachusetts Federalists
took the same step, the right to which they so expressly denied to their Virginia
colleagues ten years before.
The point, of course, was that now the national government was in the hands of
Republicans. To a certain extent, the contending political parties traded their doctrines of
state-federal relationship after 1800: the authors of the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions now supported strong central power, whereas the former proponents of the
Sedition Act started to denounce the federal government and argue for states' rights and
interposition.
On the other hand, for the Federalists, defending states' rights practically meant
advocating their, or a sectional cause. Most of the states where Federalists could claim
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political and ideological dominance were territorially grouped together in the Northeast -
in New England, with the possible addition ofNew York. As many leading Federalists of
the time observed, this region was already amalgamated by a considerable cultural
commonness that invited political unification and even enabled some of the more
resentful to talk about separation. When shortly after 1810 Timothy Dwight (1752-1817)
wrote about the prospects of the United States, he admitted that New England and New
York could well exist without the rest of the nation:
Should these [political divisions] hereafter take place, New England and New
York will, almost of course, be united in the same political body. The inhabitants
are now substantially one people... Should they be separated from their sister
states, there cannot be a doubt that their citizens will hereafter find in their local
situation, soil, and climate; in their religious and political systems; in their arts,
literature, and science; in their manners and morals; in their health, energy, and
activity, ample, perhaps peculiar sources of national greatness and prosperity. 185
New England obviously played the main part in this tandem. Although Timothy
Pickering at one point in 1803-04 envisioned New York as the center of the would-be
Northern confederacy, he also supposed the signal for separation to come from
Massachusetts, not New York. Being the place of nativity and abode of most Federalist
chieftains, New England was more likely to take the lead. Also, New Englanders played a
substantial role in New York Federalist policies, but not vice versa. Out of the 52
politicians whom David H. Fischer defines as leading New York Federalists, 1 3 ~ a
quarter ~ were born in New England. 186 At the same time, of the entire multitude ofNew
England Federalist leaders on Fischer's list -187 names ~ but five (one of them
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presumably) were born outside New England. Isaac Tichenor (1754-1838) was
supposedly born in Newark, New Jersey, and served as a commissary in the Continental
Army upon graduation from Princeton in 1775. At some point during the war he moved
to Bennington, Vermont, where legal practice propelled him into the state Assembly
(1781-84), Council (1787-92), Supreme Court (1790-96) and finally to the governor's
chair (1797-1806, 1808). 187 Another outsider, Henry Van Schaack (c.1765-1845), was
born in Kinderhook, New York. From there he moved to Pittsfield, Berkshire County,
Massachusetts, around 1781 ~ a migration of only about 24 miles to the East. He resided
in Berkshire County long enough to become one of the most influential Federalists,
second perhaps only to Theodore Sedgwick himself. In fact, after Sedgwick's retirement,
Van Schaack became "the leading political manager of Berkshire." 188 Still another
lawyer, David Howell (1747-1824) migrated from his native Morristown, New Jersey,
through Princeton to Providence, Rhode Island, where he grew from tutor to professor
and acting president of Brown. The already mentioned Aaron Burr's brother-in-law
Tapping Reeve (1744-1823) was born in Brookhaven, Long Island, and thus was formally
not a New Englander, although the demarcation line in this case was practically invisible.
Reeve later crossed the Sound to become a jurist in Litchfield, Connecticut. The founder
of the first law school in the United States (1784), he made his way into the cream of
Litchfield society ~ the so-called "Jockey Club" that united the wealthiest and mightiest
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men in town, among them the famous U. S. senator Uriah Tracy (1755-1807). Finally,
another native of Brookhaven, Benjamin Tallmadge (1754-1835), also ended up in
Litchfield, Connecticut, but as a banker.
But even though these five men achieved considerable social eminence at their
places of abode in New England and became instrumental in the Federalist leadership,
they were clearly an exception to the rule. The other 182 of 187 leading New England
Federalists listed by Fischer were ofNew England origin. The proportion is self-evident.
Cases of outsiders penetrating into the region's conservative political elite were obviously
anomalous.
Compared to the much larger and more diverse New York, New England states of
the early 1800s could boast of relative cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Fisher Ames did
not hesitate to ascribe to New England "a very distinct and well defined national
character; the only part of the United States that has yet any pretensions to it." 189 Even in
terms of distances, transportation, and infrastructure, New England was most conducive
to creating a coordinated political opposition to the federal government. And although
sharply disputed between the two contending parties, the region was also the only part of
the United States where Federalists could claim political dominance. In fact, it would
have been surprising, ifNew England had not played the key role in Federalist politics
after 1800, or if sectional feeling had not arisen here after the "Jeffersonian Revolution."
Such a distinct, cohesive region could not but come up with a political agenda of its own,
and was, so to say, doomed to play the main part in any separatist scheme. "If even the
189 «From the Palladium," HG, 29 July 1801
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New England States alone were agreed in the first instance," - Timothy Pickering wrote,
-- "would there be any difficulty in making frank and open proposition for a
separation...?" 190
Evidence from the press and correspondence ofNew England Federalists
indicates that an outburst of sectional resentment among them immediately followed their
loss of control over the presidency in late 1800. Prior to that, so long as their party
dominated national politics, the Federalists favored strong central government, privileged
the Union over states' rights and downplayed political regionalism. It was in 1801 that
their rhetoric considerably changed. A number of publications appeared criticizing the
new Republican government and calling for the unification ofNew England citizenry in
defence of the values that were presented as inherently peculiar to New England - order,
stability, good morals, religion, education, and so forth. What this meant in terms of
sectional / national relations, was that there emerged a sectionally minded political
opposition in New England that started -- quite tentatively so far -- to argue against the
national government. Thereby, the region began to oppose the rest of the nation loyal to
the Jeffersonians.
This opposition, however, did not stay the same throughout 1800-1815. The
relationship between regionalism and nationalism in the Federalist politics and
propaganda was somewhat more complicated than simply "nationalists before 1 800 ~
regionalists after 1 800." What immediately draws attention is the chronologically uneven
distribution of sectional resentment in New England during those years. Sectionalism was
190
Timothy Pickering to Theodore Lyman, 1 1 February 1804, DRNEF . 345
88
not a constant, but rather developed by fits and starts. Between 1800 and 1815, 1 have
noticed four major waves (surges) of regional protest -- in 1801, late 1803-1804, 1808-
early 1809 and 1812- early 1815. Each time an outburst of sectional rhetoric was
preceded by a new turn in national politics that Federalists perceived as unfavorable to
their party and to New England as a region. In 1801, this was Republican electoral
victory, with Thomas Jefferson occupying the presidential chair. In 1804, the rise of
sectional spirit took place in response to the Louisiana Purchase, the Twelfth Amendment
to the Constitution, and to the shuffle ofjudicial offices conducted by the Republican
administration in 1803-04. In 1808-09, the cause was the embargo; and in 1812-15,
obviously, the war against Great Britain and new trade restrictions connected to it. Each
time the reaction ofNew England grew more and more formidable. But in all the four
cases, sectional resentment in the region invariably subsided after the disappearance of an
external cause. In 1801-02, the Federalists eventually saw that Jefferson's administration
presented less danger than had been ascribed to it. In 1 804, the utter impossibility to do
anything about the Louisiana Purchase and the constitutional amendment, as well as the
general collapse of the Federalist cause with the Burr-Hamilton duel, dictated the
abatement of sectionalist passions. In 1 809, the repeal of the embargo alleviated the stress
on New England's economy; and in 1815, the unexpected news of the victory at New
Orleans and the Ghent Treaty dealt a crushing blow to whatever schemes New England
Federalists had had in mind.
Most interesting are the intermittent periods between surges of regionalism.
During those "intermissions" - 1802-1803, 1805-1807, 1809-early 1812 -- there was
were
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amazingly little sectional propaganda in New England. It looked like Federalists
perfectly content with advocating the national cause, or, to say better, advocating nothing.
Their press seldom, if ever, touched upon the dangerous political subjects that could
provoke a debate along sectional lines - Virginian dominance in national politics,
slavery, the "3/5 clause," etc. New England interests seemed nonexistent - the very
words "New England" seemed to have been almost ruled out from newspaper pages. To
say more -- Federalist authors paid amazingly little attention to internal political events in
the United States at all. Instead, they preferred to cram newspaper pages with lengthy
reports on European politics and war that could boast of minuteness unmatched by
present-day foreign policy surveys. However, as soon as there emerged any serious
ground for anti-government propaganda ~ the embargo, the war, etc. ~ Federalist writers
instantly became interested in domestic politics. A new wave of anti-government
propaganda usually ensued at once, inevitably assuming New England-oriented, sectional
character.
Thus, we can observe a recurrent pattern in the development ofNew England
sectional resistance. In the course of the first fifteen years of the 19th century, it went
through four "surges" of similar character and steadily growing force - in 1801, late
1803-04, 1808- early 1809, and 1812- early 1815. Those "surges" alternated with three
"intermissions" -- 1802-1803, 1805-1807, and 1809-early 1812 - when sectionally biased
Federalist criticism of the national government was restrained and, in terms of frequency,
rather scanty, compared to the times of "surges." Roughly speaking, whereas during the
"surges" New England Federalists were inclined towards sectionalism ( and some of them
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even towards separatism), during the "intermissions," on the other hand, they were - at
least outwardly
- nationally minded and quite comfortable with the existing relations
between states in the Union.
One may, of course, explain this phenomenon from the standpoint of pure interest.
Indeed, New England Federalists presented a sectional opposition to the national
government only when they perceived their own political, economic, or other interests
under direct threat; and as soon as the threat was gone, they normally returned to benign
nationalism. However, interest alone cannot account for this type of political behavior.
What New England Federalists were doing in the early 1800s, essentially was making
sectional or national preferences in politics. The very fact that those preferences were
being made, and that this happened quite often, suggests that something in the Federalist
mind enabled them to be so flexible in their attitude to national and sectional ideals.
A satisfactory explanation cannot bypass the question of national consciousness.
My contention is that New England Federalists had a clear idea about belonging to their
country, the United States, and that it did not differ very much from the present-day
concept of patriotism. Raised at Harvard or Yale on the heroic examples of the ancient
Greeks and Romans, Federalist leaders had learned early to appreciate patriotic sentiment
as one of the greatest civic virtues. In fact, many of them and their offspring later engaged
into artificial construction of American nationalism through numerous writings and
volunteer associations -- the readiest example being Noah Webster (1758-1843) and his
project of the "Association of American Patriots" (1808).
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high-spirited rhetorical nationalism, the Federalists of the early 1800s would not be
inferior to any subsequent generation of American politicians.
What was different from the present day, however, was that Federalists
simultaneously preserved and, more significantly, developed, a full-scale sense of
belonging to their region, that is, to New England. The important word here is
"simultaneously." Closer examination of Federalist rhetoric shows that whenever they
turned from benign nationalism to regional opposition, they did not abandon their
national allegiances but rather preserved them. And vice versa ~ whenever a transition
from sectionalism to nationalism happened, sectionalism was never totally suppressed,
but rather latently survived in the depth of the Federalist mind, waiting for the appropriate
moment to burst out. New England Federalists had worked out, subconsciously, perhaps,
a characteristic symbiosis between national and sectional loyalties that could fascinate
our contemporaries but which evidently presented no logical contradiction to them.
This becomes evident when one consults New England political pamphlets of the
early 19th century. This actually required considerable selection and scrutiny, for the very
definition of a political pamphlet is considerably blurred. I tried to select only those
pamphlets where political content proved significant. Of course, I have not studied all the
contemporary pamphlets; however, the ones presented here are numerous enough to form
a good sample.
Chronologically, I included only pamphlets published from 1801 ~ the first year
when Federalists found themselves in opposition ~ through 1814, the last full year of
warfare with Great Britain. I did not include 1815 for fear of confusing matters by
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introducing sources that reflect the new political mood attendant upon the close of the
war. Geographically, only pamphlets published in New England were selected, though
occasionally a New York pamphlet is considered, if directly pertinent to New England
politics. In terms of content, only oppositional political pamphlets were reckoned; others
whose attitude to the government policy might be described as neutral or sympathetic,
were discarded.
As a result of selection, I got 67 New England oppositional political pamphlets of
1801-1814. The criterion selected for their analysis is the availability and prevalence of
national or sectional rhetoric in the pamphlets. In other words, to which feelings and
priorities of the people - to their national consciousness or to their purely local, regional
New England affiliations - did the Federalist authors appeal?
I have chosen two categories of evaluation: 1) "national rhetoric"; 2) "sectional
or local rhetoric". Each one has 2 sub-categories: a) this kind of rhetoric was present
clearly, expressly, and played an important role in the content; b) such rhetoric was
present in the text but only in passing.
For the 67 pamphlets, the results look as follows. National rhetoric prevails in 13
pamphlets
192
and is visible in another 49. Local rhetoric prevails in 24 cases
193
and is
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H. Moore, A Discourse. Delivered at Milford : J. Lathrop, The Present War Unexpected : H. Small, Ode.
in J. Tufts, An Oration Pronounced before the Federal Republicans of Charlestown. Massachusetts. July 4.
1814. Being the Anniversary of American Independence. (Charlestown, 1814); Proceedings of a
Convention of Delegates from the Counties of Hampshire. Franklin, and Hampden : S. Austin, A Sermon,
Preached in Worcester : Mr. Gaston's Speech : W. Sullivan, An Oration : A. Haskell, Oration Pronounced at
Fitchburg : An Address of the Members of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United
States, to Their Constituents, on the Sub ject of the War with Great Britain. (Alexandria, 1812); Timothy
Pickering, Letters Addressed to the People of the United States of America. (London, 1811); Fisher Ames,
"Phocion," no. 1, in Works of Fisher Ames , vol. 2. (Boston, 1854), 152; Moses Dow, A Sermon, Preached
in Beverley : Isaac C. Bates, An Oration. Pronounced Before the Washington Benevolent Society pf the
County of Hampshire, on Their First Anniversary. 1 812. In Commemoration of the Nativity of
Washington. (Northampton: Printed by William Butler, 1812).
93
simply present in 28 others. Thus, national rhetoric is present in 62, and sectional - in 52
out of 67 pamphlets. A good example of national rhetoric clearly and expressly stated is
the following passage:
Washington had no foreign predilections; his education, habits, and feelings were
all American. Hence, we find in his administration, he exhibited a strict
impartiality towards foreign nations, and consulted only the best interests,
welfare, and peace of the United States. 194
An example of clearly and expressly stated sectional rhetoric is this passage about
the possibility of war with Great Britain:
But even the people ofNew England would come to a pause! <...> Thus
oppressed, exhausted, and alarmed, detesting the causes of the war, and looking
forward to the fatal termination of the alliance with France, would they not find
themselves reduced to that state of extreme necessity which always provides for
itself? Would they not, in such a case, feel compelled to seek by the law ofself-
preservation, their safety by a separate peace, and to leave the southern states to
prosecute a war, which they had most wantonly brought upon the country? 195
Both examples are vivid and clear. What is interesting, however, is that they both come
from the same pamphlet. The name is also characteristic ~ "New England Patriot."
An Address to the Citizens of Massachusetts : D. Osgood, A Solemn Protest : T. Andros. The Grand Era :
Kiah Bayley, War a Calamity
:
Elijah Mills, An Oration Pronounced at Northampton : J. Lathrop, A
Discourse on the Law of Retaliation, Delivered in the New Brick Church. February 6. 1814. (Boston,
1814); Timothy Bigelow, An Address. Delivered on the Third Anniversary : Charles Prentiss, A Poem
Delivered at Brookfield : Idem., New England Freedom : [J. Lowell], Thoughts in a Series of Letters : Facts
Are Stubborn Things: An Address to the Citizens of the County of Plymouth : Southern Oppression :
Inquiry into the Object and Tendency of the Present War : A Defence of the Clergy ofNew England : [J.
Lowell], Jefferson Against Madison's War : John S. J. Gardiner, A Discourse Delivered at Trinity Church ;
[J. Lowell], Mr. Madison's War : Ibid., Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr. Madison : Fisher Ames,
"Falkland," no. 2, 4; "Phocion," no. 4, in Works of Fischer Ames, vol. 2, (Boston, 1854); Observations on
the Rhode Island Coal, and Certificates With Regard to Its Qualities. Value, and Various Uses, [Boston,
1814]: A Defence of the Clergy of Massachusetts. (Boston. 1804).
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John Lowell, The New England Patriot. Being a Candid Comparison of the Principles and Conduct of
the Washington and Jefferson Administrations. The Whole Founded Upon Indisputable Facts and Public
Documents, to Which Reference Is Made in the Tex t and Notes. (Boston. 1810), 19.
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Ibid., 147-148 (italics added).
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The author was John Lowell, one of the most prominent Federalist radicals and
the creator of the strongest oppositional writings of the time, including the famous
pamphlet, Mr. Madison's War (1812). 196 Scholars usually mention him as a radical
secessionist given to rhetorical excesses. Lowell was indeed radical, and often went
further than other Federalists did, at times directly speaking about the necessity of
disunion. Sometimes he would favor the secession ofNew England from the United
States, sometimes, of the West from the East. What is fascinating, however, is that his
works were densely imbued with national rhetoric. Loudly sounds the motive of offended
national dignity in the same New England Patriot :
The first, and one of the earliest proofs of the partiality and submission of our
administration to France, and which has continued to the present day is the
unexampled meanness of the language of our ministers , at the court of Bonaparte.
Among the whole host of ambassadors from the new made, tributary, and vassal
kings, who surround the throne of this monarch-making emperor, there is no
single representative, who has exhibited a more humble, submissive temper, or
adopted language of more fulsome adulation, than the American ministers in
France, nor did ever the ambassadors from a conquered prince experience such
marked and so frequently repeated insults and indignities, as have been received
l 0*7
by our ministers at the imperial court.
In the New England Patriot alone the pronouns "we" and "our," respecting the
President, the U. S. government, American army and navy, U. S. citizens, single federal
John Lowell, Mr. Madison's War. A Dispassionate Inquiry into the Reasons Alleged by Mr. Madison
for Declaring an Offensive and Ruinous War Against Great Britain. By a New England Farmer. (Boston,
1812); Idem.. Perpetual War. The Policy of Mr. Madison. (Boston. 1812); Idem., JeffergQn Against
Madison's War . [Boston?, 1812]; Idem., The New England Patriot: Being a Candid Comparison of the
Principles and Conduct of the Washington and Jefferson Administration s. The Whole Founded Upon
Indisputable Facts and Public Documents, to Which Reference Is Made in the Text and Notes, (Boston,
1810); Idem., The Road to Peace. Commerce. Wealth, and Happiness. Bv an Old Farmer, [Boston, 1813].
Idem., Thoughts in a Series of Letters, in Answer to a Question Respecting the Division of the States. By a
Massachusetts Farmer, (n.p., 1813).
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John Lowell, The New-England Patriot . 47-48, italics added.
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employees, the nation in general, appear not less than 450 times on 148 pages. One comes
across such expressions as "the honor of our country" (p. 12), "the honor and interest of
the United States" (p. 26), "our honor and independence" (p. 96). In other words, close
reading indicates that Lowell had a clear idea about the ideals of patriotism. Nevertheless,
as we have seen, he readily encouraged New England states to conclude a separate
armistice with a potential enemy and withdraw from the war effort of the United States.
In our sample ofNew England oppositional pamphlets, those with exclusively
national or exclusively sectional rhetoric are clearly a minority. They constitute but 19
out of 67 imprints analyzed (28%).
198
In most pamphlets, both types of rhetoric are
present. The figures given above also prove this: 62 cases of national and 52 of sectional
rhetoric out of the overall 67 pamphlets indicate considerable overlap between the two
groups.
Here is what Kiah Bayley, a minister in Newcastle, Maine, said in 1812:
I feel as an American, love the country ofmy nativity, and cannot endure to see
the evils that are coming upon her, without raising my voice to avert them. 199
But, reading further:
I believe a very great proportion of the people in New England, New York and
New Jersey, are totally dissatisfied with the war. ...All which should be dear to
198
J. McKean, Sermon. The Question of War with Great Britain Examined Upon Moral and Christian
Principles. (Boston, 1808); An Address to the Citizens of Massachusetts, on the Causes and Remedy of Our
National Distresses. By a Fellow Sufferer. (Boston, 1808); William E. Channing, A Sermon Preached in
Boston. July 23. 1812 : John Cleveland, A Discourse Delivered on the Day of National Humiliation and
Prayer. August 20. 1812. (Boston, 1812); Josiah Webster, A Sermon Delivered at Newburyport. November
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freemen, is put in jeopardy by the war, into which the nation has been plunged by
an overbearing southern influence. Can a nation thus divided stand? ... Can you
believe that a war driven on by the slave holders of the south and the back
woodsmen of the west, is really undertaken for the defence of our seamen, and the
protection of our commerce?200
In the first excerpt we have a vivid example of patriotism, whereas in the second
one the same author speaks only about the interests of his section of the country and
regards the South and the West in negative terms.
Many other vivid examples are available, which time does not allow me to give.
But the idea is clear enough. The one did not exist without the other. Sectional and
national rhetoric were closely intertwined in the texts of oppositional pamphlets.
Another example of this intermix of the sectional and the national is the so-called
Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts. Founded on February 22, 1812, in
Boston, this was a purely political organization designed to broaden and deepen the
20
1
Federalist party's base. The official activities of the Society mainly consisted of
unlimited acclamation of the personality and political principles of the first President in
whose good old days, the Federalists asserted, the United States had flourished in all
respects. Following the usual Federalist logic, "the Washingtonians" then proceeded to
criticize Jefferson and Madison for ruining that paradise by abandoning the principles of
Washington's "bequest." In particular, they attacked the war. Elijah H. Mills, a prominent
Federalist from Northampton, Massachusetts, exclaimed furiously:
War having been declared, we have been told from high authority, "that all
opposition to it is a species of moral treason, and must cease;" and "that the voice
of complaint must be silenced." Go preach this doctrine to slaves. The sons of
200
Ibid., 19.
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The Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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Massachusetts imbibed different principles, in the schools of their fathers. Rocked
in the cradle of freedom, they were early instructed in their rights, and they have
yet to learn the duty of quiet acquiescence, in ruinous measures, or silent
submission, to wanton injustice and oppression.202
It was at the meetings of the various New England Washington Benevolent
Societies that many secessionist declarations resounded.203
On the one hand, the Federalists had founded the Washington Benevolent
Societies in order to criticize the policy of the Republican administration. Sometimes this
assumed the form of sectional argumentation, but even if not, the anti-government
propaganda of the Society's members undoubtedly helped undermine the authority of the
central power. On the other hand, the Society also idolized George Washington as a
national hero. This could not but contribute to the development of American national
consciousness. To say more, during the War of 1812 the Massachusetts W. B. S.
repeatedly sent congratulatory addresses to the captains of American ships victorious
over the British and held public festivities in commemoration of those victories. This was
in marked contrast with the general Federalist disapprobation of this war.204 Thus, with
one hand, the Federalists undermined the national government, with the other one, they
supported it.
Elijah H. Mills, An Oration Pronounced at Northampton . 12-13.
203
Timothy Bigelow, An Address . 15; Elijah H. Mills, An Oration Pronounced at Northampton . 23;
Charles Prentiss, A Poem Delivered at Brookfield . 10; Idem., New England Freedom. 14, 27-28.
204
For example, at the meeting on December 8, 1812, the Massachusetts Society decided to express its
gratitude to Commodore Decatur, the officers and crew of the frigate United States "for the gallantry and
skill they so eminently displayed in the late glorious action, which terminated in the capture of the British
frigate, Macedonian "( The Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts, journals, 26-27,
Massachusetts Historical Society). On February 22, 1813, the Society expressed its gratitude to
Commodore Bainbridge, officers and crew of the frigate Constitution for the capture of the British frigate
Java (ibid., 30).
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It is also worth remembering how strongly the Federalist-controlled legislature of
Massachusetts reacted to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in 1 799. The legislature
repudiated the Resolutions and solemnly proclaimed that a state did not have the right to
discuss the decisions made by the federal government. Ten years after, however, during
the embargo, the legislature declared (1 809) that a state did have such a right and not only
discussed but openly condemned the act of the federal government that strengthened
205
embargo measures. In both cases Federalists took diametrically opposite stands in
regard to the central government, depending on what was profitable to them at that
particular moment. Republicans, remarkably, acted in the same way. The Virginia and
Kentucky resolutions of 1798-1799 written mainly by Thomas Jefferson were a model
piece of regionalism. Nevertheless, as soon as the Republicans gained power in 1800,
they "switched" over to the doctrine of a strong national government.
The examples considered here testify of a close, integral coexistence of the
national and the sectional in the rhetoric and behavior « hence, in the state of mind, of
New England Federalists. This leads me to certain conclusions.
Evidently, one may speak about the relativity of national consciousness - a
certain dualism that was present in the New England society in the early 1800s. National
consciousness in its proper form, that is, as a sense of belonging to the life and fate of one
country, one fatherland, one nation - the United States ~ had by the early 19th century
taken shape among educated New Englanders. The Federalists spoke quite consciously
and often of the United States as their country, and expressed patriotism as a national
II. V. Ames, ed., State Documents on FedemLB^lalioiis, 30-35.
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feeling, using such terms as "our nation," "my country," etc. On the other hand, local and
sectional loyalties remained strong as well. Apparently, in the Federalist mind there
existed a certain equilibrium, a balance between national and sectional ideals. Whichever
would prevail at this or that time, depended on the general situation in the United States
and in New England at a particular moment. At different circumstances, the same
Federalists could profess either national or sectional ideals. Whenever they felt a threat
from the federal government to their political, economic, moral, etc. interests and
principles, their loyalties "switched" from the national to the sectional level. And vice
versa - when the federal government was in the hands of those who expressed their
interests - the representatives of their party (and often region and social group) - they
supported it and therefore professed national ideals. The national government by itself
presented little more than symbolic value. In practice it retained such value only as long
as "the proper people" held the reins. National loyalty appears to have been a trade item
to be put at stake as the last recourse in party warfare. To put it briefly, preference was
given to the national over the sectional loyalty, when and where this was profitable. The
behavior of the legislature of Massachusetts in 1799 and 1809 serves as an example here,
as does the increase of sectional resentment in pamphlet rhetoric during the War of 1812.
However, not everything depended on interest. Evidently, the Federalists would
"become" nationalists or regionalists depending not only on the concerns of practicality
but also on their own psychological disposition at a particular moment. The overlap of
national and sectional rhetoric in pamphlets, as well as the contradictory behavior of the
Washington Benevolent Society, suggests that even in their activities purely oppositional
to the general government, the Federalists sometimes not undermined but reinforced this
government
- perhaps, contrary to their own will.
It is possible that the existence of an unsteady balance in the people's minds, that
could easily tilt to either national or sectional side, is characteristic of the initial period of
the formation of American national consciousness. One may also suppose that any
substantial deterioration of the political situation, like the War of 1812, could provoke
secession of a region that felt disadvantaged. The war ended unexpectedly, and nobody
knows what would have happened had the events developed otherwise. After all, it is
worth remembering how the Southerners - patriots and nationalists to the utmost during
the War of 1812 -- acted less than fifty years later, when they perceived their regional
interests under threat from the North; and what the outcome of such a Southern
perception was for the United States.
The unshaped and unsteady condition of national consciousness in the minds of
many New England Federalists in the early 1800s by no means precluded but rather,
suggested that at critical moments they would be able to make critical steps. Bearing this
in mind, an attempt of Northern secession in 1815 will not seem so improbable.
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